Mama Sees You
Champions of the Internet have long touted its anarchic properties as ideally suited to promoting political freedom in authoritarian states like China. So far, however, this proposition seems to rest more on anecdotal enthusiasm than objective evidence. Indeed, as Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas of the Carnegie Endowment’s Information Revolution and World Politics Project argue ...
Champions of the Internet have long touted its anarchic properties as ideally suited to promoting political freedom in authoritarian states like China. So far, however, this proposition seems to rest more on anecdotal enthusiasm than objective evidence. Indeed, as Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas of the Carnegie Endowment's Information Revolution and World Politics Project argue in "The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution" (July 2001), "effective control of the Internet is much more prevalent than conventional wisdom would suggest."
Champions of the Internet have long touted its anarchic properties as ideally suited to promoting political freedom in authoritarian states like China. So far, however, this proposition seems to rest more on anecdotal enthusiasm than objective evidence. Indeed, as Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas of the Carnegie Endowment’s Information Revolution and World Politics Project argue in "The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution" (July 2001), "effective control of the Internet is much more prevalent than conventional wisdom would suggest."
True, Internet access has grown exponentially in China: It had reached more than 17 million people by the end of 2000 and is predicted to approach that of Japan by 2004. But the Chinese Communist Party has historically kept a choke collar on mass media, and the Internet has proved no exception. For starters, as Kalathil and Boas write, "the development of the Internet in China has been largely a product of state initiative," as Beijing turned to information technology to help modernize the economy and decentralize decision making. As more Chinese gained access to the World Wide Web, the state relied on filtering technology and self-censorship to keep out threatening content. Web sites are frequently blocked or summarily shut down, and chat rooms are policed by "Big Mamas," who quickly delete "offensive" material (see "China’s Dot-Communism," Foreign Policy, January/February 2001).
In Cuba, by contrast, Internet growth has been steady but slow. According to government figures released in March 2001, only 60,000 out of a population of 11 million have been granted e-mail accounts, and fewer than half of these account holders can send messages internationally. Web sites are typically not blocked, note Kalathil and Boas, but the regime restricts access to the politically trustworthy by giving connections only to academic institutions and government offices. There is only one (prohibitively expensive) Internet cafe in Havana for everyone else. Both China and Cuba have also taken a proactive approach, using the Internet to disseminate propaganda and making plans for national intranets that will allow access to only officially approved material. The fate of such efforts will be one more piece of evidence in determining whether the relationship between the Internet and freedom is one in which the medium is, in fact, the message.
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