The Empire Rarely Strikes Back

Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 2001, London

The United States rarely responds to international terrorism with military force. Indeed, although foreign terrorists attacked American citizens, facilities, or interests more than 2,400 times between 1983 and 1998, the U.S. government responded with overt military action only three times. So why have retaliatory decisions been adopted now, following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon? Certainly, none of the previous terrorist incidents were as catastrophic or generated as much fear among the public. But is the sheer magnitude of the latest assaults and their location enough to explain America’s "new war" on terrorism?

Former U.S. intelligence officer Michele L. Malvesti sheds light on this question in her article "Explaining the United States’ Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists," appearing in a recent issue of the London-based quarterly journal Terrorism and Political Violence. Malvesti, currently a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, identifies key factors that lead U.S. policymakers to adopt a strategy against international terrorism supplemented or supplanted with military interventions abroad.

Prior to the September 11 attacks, the only terrorist acts that elicited a U.S. military response were Libya’s bombing of a West German nightclub in 1986, Iraq’s plot to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush in Kuwait in 1993, and the bombing by Osama bin Laden’s operatives of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Relying on public statements by presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, Malvesti identifies four features common to these incidents that appeared necessary to spark a military reprisal. First, the perpetrators must be clearly identified; second, the perpetrators must have previously committed acts of terrorism against the United States; third, U.S. interests must be the primary focus of the attack; and fourth, U.S. citizens in particular must be targeted.

However, these four criteria were present in 61 additional terrorist incidents, none of which led to an overt U.S. military retaliation. So Malvesti offers five more characteristics. First, the terrorist act must be already accomplished and irreversible. Second, the attack must target not just U.S. citizens but the American government in particular. Third, the responsible party must be identified almost immediately. Fourth, the aggressors must exhibit a publicly defiant attitude toward the United States. And finally, perpetrators must be militarily and politically vulnerable to a retaliatory strike.

By her own admission, Malvesti disregards internal factors affecting the decision to deploy military force — such as public opinion — and her model excludes actors and institutions involved in the American political process. Even more critically, however, Malvesti ignores any sense of hierarchy among her explanatory variables. Indeed, if the current campaign is any indication, her last factor appears most crucial. The United States seems to use military force against international terrorism only when the perpetrators and their supporters appear relatively weak.

Afghanistan, for instance, is considered an acceptable target for American rage due to the theocratic Taliban regime’s willingness to host Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist network. Of course, Afghanistan also happens to be poor, internally fragmented, internationally isolated, and militarily weak. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia — a wealthy country and key player in the global oil market — would never qualify as a potential target for U.S. military retaliation. Little matter that this sultanistic regime has for years spread a peculiar Islamic fundamentalist creed, based on Wahhabism, filled with anti-Western feelings. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has tolerated the financing of a global terrorist network from within its own banking system. This double standard, once perceived among friendly and unfriendly audiences around the world, particularly in Arab countries, only complicates the legitimization of a U.S. military response, already shaky due to intelligence failures in proper targeting and collateral damage inflicted on civilian populations.

Instead of hastily orchestrating international coalitions to back unilateral or quasi-unilateral military strikes, the United States should enhance multilateral cooperation in order to prevent and control transnational terrorism. In the mid- to long term, a better approach requires further intergovernmental efforts at managing regional conflicts prone to radicalization, as in the Middle East. In the more pressing short term, the United States should strengthen cross-border collaboration between law enforcement and intelligence services, mainly but not exclusively among democracies, so as to fight a common and major security concern. Unfortunately, even a much-needed settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will no longer have immediate consequences for a global terrorist threat stimulated by religiously sanctioned hatred.