Unfamiliar Ground

Journalists and commentators covering Afghanistan and Pakistan have addressed everything from geopolitics to tribal dynamics, reconstruction aid, and, of course, terrorism. Even the casual observer has probably read stories that have addressed U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts, most notably the use of Hellfire missile-armed Predator and Reaper drones. In covering these topics, pundits often pause to cite the area’s difficult physical terrain, often mentioning it as a factor in the region’s long history of repelling foreign armies. However, none of these analysts has yet written about the sad state of the United States’ basic terrain data (specifically the Digital Terrain Elevation Data — DTED) over this region, which has emerged as an obstacle in conducting operations over such complex terrain.

This is not a national security secret. It’s just knowledge that simply doesn’t often make it out of the jargon-laden community of geodetic science, remote sensing, and military terrain analysis. The general news consumer (and, in my experience, many in our national security leadership) assume that, in this age of Google Earth, U.S. forces have all the information they need. Unfortunately, these assumptions are both limiting U.S. mission effectiveness and getting people killed.

So, here’s a short primer on this arcane, but vitally important subject.

Terrain data is collected by taking measurements at a certain "post spacing," or the distance between each data point, which varies depending on the sensor used and the altitude from which it is collected. For instance, in 2000, NASA and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency conducted the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM), which collected 30-meter post spacing terrain data for everything that falls between northern Russia and southern Argentina. The measurements were taken from Space Shuttle Endeavour, which was orbiting the Earth at an altitude of 233 kilometers. This means that, every 30 meters or so, the U.S. defense and intelligence community has an elevation reading of what the terrain looked like in 2000. What the terrain looks like between these 30-meter intervals is anyone’s guess.

Well, actually, in the case of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, local fighters know the answer intimately. U.S. and Pakistani military forces, however, do not, and so for the unsuspecting soldier, those 30 meters could hold a ravine, a structural impediment, a rugged natural obstacle, impassable vegetation, or some other kind of deadly cul-de-sac within a canyon complex. But U.S. soldiers usually don’t know what to expect until it’s too late.

There has been some higher-resolution terrain data collected, but very little at the 1-meter post spacing typically considered sufficient for military operations over urban and complex terrain. Furthermore, high-resolution color imagery is rarely collected simultaneously with terrain data, meaning that operators and analysts lack detailed visual knowledge of any "bump" that they observe.

The war effort also desperately needs for such terrain data collections to be unclassified, so they can be revealed to coalition partners and host-nation militaries. Anyone who has worked in this field understands how rare it is for the intelligence community to collect data it is willing to share. But the military terrain analysis community has done so for several years, despite working on a shoestring budget. What’s more, the terrain analysis community has made this data broadly available to war fighters, as well as the development community

The United States has now been in Afghanistan for eight years. Despite spending hundreds of billions of dollars in the country, the United States still does not possess terrain data of the same quality as that routinely collected by local, state, and federal agencies within the United States. This is not for lack of commercially available terrain sensors or of contractors willing to fly in Afghanistan or Pakistan. It is because policymakers aren’t aware of this critical need. The collection of high-resolution terrain data in Afghanistan is within the power of top U.S. and NATO commanders — but it will require collaboration, policy reform, technical cooperation, and a substantial investment of resources.

As we continue to wrestle with Sir Mortimer Durand’s dubious legacy — the "Durand Line" that divides Afghanistan and Pakistan — perhaps we can agree that the United States and its allies cannot succeed in their mission if they literally do not know where they are heading.