When it comes to Iran, do you feel lucky?

Nader Mousavizadeh, a special assistant to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan from 1997 to 2003, writes in The New Republic that the United States should prioritize democratization over de-nuclearization in Iran:

The fracturing of the Islamic Republic’s traditional elite, and the persistence and power of Iran’s democratic awakening six months later, make clear that a regime change is under way in Iran–one that is indigenous, sustainable, democratic in spirit, and peaceful in its means. It is the most promising development in the broader Middle East in the past quarter-century. Rather than being viewed as a sideshow, the uprising should be at the core of every policy decision regarding Iran. Western leaders should ask themselves just one question whenever faced with a new set of measures toward Iran: Will they help or hurt the Green Movement?

For all the concern about a fitful and still highly vulnerable nuclear program, a far greater prize is now in sight: a freer society and an accountable government under the rule of law. An opportunity now exists to encourage the evolution of a democratic Iran–through careful, calibrated, and principled policies that refuse to be baited by the crude and bellicose behavior of a usurper president. 

Now, I’m sure Flynt Leverett and other purebred realists would vehemently disagree with this assessment.  And I’m sure that William Kristol and other neoconservatives would vehemently agree with this sentiment. 

For the rest of you, does this preference ordering make sense?  To me, it seems that you need to take the following variables into account:

1. What is the likelihood of a second Iranian Revolution?  Mousavizadeh seems to think it’s a virtual certainty.  I’m probably more optimistic than most Iran-watchers, and I’d give it a 50/50 shot at best.
2. If a revolution took place, what is the likelihood that the new Iranian government would be more amenable on the nuclear issue?  Again, Mousavizadeh seems to think this is a virtual certainty.  Me, I’m not so sure.   
3. If a revolution took place, what would be the additional positive policy externalities?  An implicit point in Mousavizadeh’s essay is that on a whole array of other issues, a democratic Iran would be much more constructive.  This is indeed possible — I suspect support for, say, Hezbollah might dry up.  That said, it is equally possible that a democratic Iran would freak out the non-Democratic Sunni states in the region just as much as a revolutionary theocracy has done in the past.

 None of this is to say that a carrt-and-stick appoach on the nuclear issue is going to work either.  If you’re comfotable with risk, an approach that marginally boosts the likelihood of a Green Revolution taking place might be the best play. 

I bring up these questions, however, because it’s possible that a carrot-and-stick approach that prioritizes the nuclear issue over the regime change issue is the best of a really lousy set of policy options. 

Developing….