Strange “recidivism” numbers
In order to return to doing something, you needed to have been doing it before. That was the point made in the media scrum after the Pentagon reported last spring that 14 percent of released Guantanamo detainees went "back to the battlefield." Numerous commentators — including Peter Bergen at the New America Foundation — noted ...
In order to return to doing something, you needed to have been doing it before.
In order to return to doing something, you needed to have been doing it before.
That was the point made in the media scrum after the Pentagon reported last spring that 14 percent of released Guantanamo detainees went "back to the battlefield." Numerous commentators — including Peter Bergen at the New America Foundation — noted that there was little evidence that the released detainees were ever really terrorists at all. For instance, Andy Worthington estimates that 93 percent never had anything to do with al Qaeda. They were just in the wrong place at the wrong time, picked up on the battlefield or sold into U.S. detention by warlords.
So, I was incredulous when yesterday Bloomberg News reported that the Pentagon said 20 percent of released Guantanamo detainees had "returned" to the fight — offering no raw data about that jarring statistic.
What it really means: The number is simply not reliable, and the term "recidivism" is not useful. If someone were legitimately a terrorist they should never be let go. For the United States to release even a single real terrorist is a terrifically frightening possibilty — more frightening than the idea a radical might return to radicalism after a spell in prison. And if the released detainees weren’t terrorists before and became terrorists once released — that’s something very, very different indeed.
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