Iran and Iraq
What should be the Obama administration’s focus in the Middle East for Year Two? For me, it’s a no-brainer: consolidating success in Iraq and supporting democratic change in Iran. Iraq is at an important crossroads. Things could go very well in 2010 or they could begin to unravel. There’s no doubt that President Obama’s artificially imposed ...
What should be the Obama administration's focus in the Middle East for Year Two? For me, it's a no-brainer: consolidating success in Iraq and supporting democratic change in Iran.
What should be the Obama administration’s focus in the Middle East for Year Two? For me, it’s a no-brainer: consolidating success in Iraq and supporting democratic change in Iran.
Iraq is at an important crossroads. Things could go very well in 2010 or they could begin to unravel. There’s no doubt that President Obama’s artificially imposed August timeline for removing all U.S. combat troops has introduced an unnecessary element of added uncertainty to the mix, and will serve as an accelerant of instability.
That said, the process remains manageable if balanced by steady progress in the political, economic, diplomatic, and security spheres, mainly: 1) Another free and fair parliamentary election that, without excessive delay, produces a reasonably competent national government; 2) The start of a serious campaign to deliver basic services, attract foreign investment, and generate jobs and economic growth for the Iraqi people; 3) Iraq’s further integration into its own neighborhood; and 4) The continued strengthening of the Iraqi security services. All these tasks remain seriously challenging, but eminently achievable — especially if buttressed by deep, consistent American engagement, led by Obama himself, that reflects an appreciation for Iraq’s critical importance to the Persian Gulf region and the enormous long-term benefits that would accrue from an effective U.S.-Iraqi strategic partnership.
In Iran, the administration’s current strategy leaves it confronting a series of bad choices: stand by while the Islamic Republic gets ever closer to acquiring nuclear weapons; support military action to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability; or (less likely) strike a "deal" with Iran’s illegitimate rulers that few believe they will keep. An infinitely better outcome — and one that, since June 12, is now well within the realm of possibility (if still not probable) — would be the success of Iran’s democratic opposition, the so-called Green Movement. Advancing an agenda of greater democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and Iran’s reconciliation with the outside world, the Greens’ triumph promises tremendous strategic payoffs to the United States — not to mention the Iranian people. While not a panacea, the effective end of the Islamic Republic as we have known it these past 30 years, and its replacement by a democratizing regime seeking to restore Iran’s status as a "normal," non-revolutionary regional power, would almost certainly make the problems posed by its nuclear program and support for terrorism far more amenable to diplomatic resolution.
More broadly, the demise of Iran’s theocratic dictatorship would constitute a major victory for the West in the broader war on terror. Khomeini’s 1979 revolution marked the birth of modern Islamist radicalism and anti-American terrorism. The mullahs’ success in seizing control of a major Middle Eastern state and waging a three-decade long campaign of hostilities against America, the "Great Satan," has inspired extremists across the Sunni-Shiite divide, including al Qaeda. Khomeiniism’s defeat at the hands of a peaceful, democratic opposition committed to re-establishing relations with America would strike a devastating blow in the ideological struggle that lies at the heart of the West’s confrontation with violent jihadism. Indeed, it’s no stretch to say that it would mark the most positive and transformative geo-strategic development since the collapse of Soviet communism. Given that fact … given the very real — albeit still small — chance that the Green revolution could actually succeed in the next 12-24 months … and given the paucity of favorable policy alternatives … U.S. interests would be well served by a concerted strategy to do everything possible to support the Greens’ success.
It’s worth noting the intense synergies between these efforts in Iraq and Iran. After all, what better form of pressure could we hope to exert on Iran’s illegitimate rulers than the example of a credible election in next-door Iraq, where the world’s most highly esteemed, but quietist Shiite clergy serves not to steal the peoples’ votes, but as the foremost guardian of the integrity of the democratic process? And how much greater would Iraq’s chances of success become absent the Islamic Republic’s harmful meddling and support for violent extremists? Of course, it goes without saying that were President Obama actually to succeed in forging a new axis of democratic cooperation between the United States, Iraq, and Iran — arguably, the Gulf’s three most influential powers — it would not only revolutionize the geopolitics of the Middle East; it would also guarantee his place as a truly consequential foreign policy president.
John Hannah is a senior fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America and a former national security advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney.
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