COIN commander reveals: Here’s what worked for me in Ramadi
One of the more interesting presentations at the conference I attended recently in Tampa on the Anbar Awakening was by Brig. Gen. Sean MacFarland, who as a colonel commanded an Army brigade in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, in 2006-2007. At a time when top American commanders were telling their subordinates to disengage and ...
One of the more interesting presentations at the conference I attended recently in Tampa on the Anbar Awakening was by Brig. Gen. Sean MacFarland, who as a colonel commanded an Army brigade in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, in 2006-2007. At a time when top American commanders were telling their subordinates to disengage and pull back onto big bases, MacFarland did the opposite, working with tribes, establishing outposts, and encouraging tribal sheikhs to turn against al Qaeda. When Gen. Petraeus arrived in Iraq in February 2007, one of the first things he did was fly out to Ramadi to see what MacFarland was doing -- which turned out to be an updated version of what Petraeus's protégé H.R. McMaster had done in Tel Afar in 2005-2006.
One of the more interesting presentations at the conference I attended recently in Tampa on the Anbar Awakening was by Brig. Gen. Sean MacFarland, who as a colonel commanded an Army brigade in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, in 2006-2007. At a time when top American commanders were telling their subordinates to disengage and pull back onto big bases, MacFarland did the opposite, working with tribes, establishing outposts, and encouraging tribal sheikhs to turn against al Qaeda. When Gen. Petraeus arrived in Iraq in February 2007, one of the first things he did was fly out to Ramadi to see what MacFarland was doing — which turned out to be an updated version of what Petraeus’s protégé H.R. McMaster had done in Tel Afar in 2005-2006.
Gen. MacFarland gave me permission to quote from the unpublished paper he presented. Here goes.
- First, he argues that all counterinsurgency is local. That makes sense because it is a form of politics.
- Second, the people are indeed the key to the solution. But, he adds, "It is not enough to protect the population, they must be given the means to protect themselves." (Interesting point for whoever revises the Army/Marine COIN manual to mull.) "Bottom line: We promised them the means to secure themselves in a way that did not disrupt their cultural order." That is, he explains, they didn’t want police directed by Baghdad because they feared Iranian infiltration of Iraqi security forces.
- Third, to engage in genuine COIN is to grab the tail of the dragon. You can’t lead the local uprising, "All you can do is enable it." And you will operate not only on very incomplete knowledge, you often will know less than the other people in the room-like who and where the bad guys are.
- And don’t expect to rest on your laurels. One fix creates another problem. If you succeed, your problems are hardly over. "As the threat receded, old rivalries began to re-emerge."
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