What else can’t IAEA safeguard inspections do?

When I read the first few sentences of David Kay’s National Interest essay on Iran and nuclear inspections, I said, "uh-oh": 

There is a global consensus that any agreement with Iran on ensuring its nuclear program is for civilian purposes only will have to involve inspections to verify its disarmament. But as a former weapons inspector, I have very bad news for you: a weapons-inspection regime in Iran will not work. Inspections themselves are most effective when both the state being inspected and the inspecting countries are fully on board—and even then there are limits. An inspection regime can never ensure full disarmament.

David Kay knows a lot about inspections, so this looked to be depressing reading. 

As I read the rest of the essay, however, it dawned on me that while Kay’s point was correct, it was also banal.  Of course inspections will not be foolproof.*  The thing is, I don’t think anyone really believes that to be true.  Indeed, Kay provides no evidence or quotations for the "global consensus"  that inspections will be perfect. 

You would also think, from that first paragraph, that Kay believes that inspections have no utility.  But then we get to this section:

[T]he purpose of IAEA oversight remains one of the most misunderstood elements of discussions about establishing an effective international inspection and verification regime. Inspection and verification are often thought of as ways to prevent a state from developing nuclear weapons. This is certainly not the case, and what’s more, it would be well beyond the capabilities of any conceivable inspection regime tasked with this verification mandate. If a country decides to break its international obligations and proceed with a nuclear-weapons program, the only options are military action by other countries or the acceptance of an atomically armed state. Inspectors simply do not have the military force that would be required to dissuade Iran or any other nation determined to breach its obligations and acquire nuclear weapons….

Instead, the goal is to create the equivalent of a strong plate-glass window that Iran would have to shatter if it were to embark upon a militarily significant nuclear program—and that inspectors could be reasonably expected to detect that shattering.

Um… that’s exactly what I think are the purpose of IAEA inspection.  The first metaphor that came to my mind was "tripwire," but you get the idea. 

Kay’s essay is extremely odd.  Any realistic appraisal of IAEA safeguard inspections would posit that they are an imperfect but useful method of divining Iran’s intentions with regard to their nuclear program.  I’m pretty sure that is Kay’s assessment as well.  The entire tenor of his essay, however, seems designed to deflate some mythical belief in the power of inspections that no one possesses. 

*Readers are encouraged to suggest other hyperbolic feats of strength that IAEA safeguard inspections cannot accomplish.