The dumb sanctions that toppled Kyrgyzstan’s regime
The Washington Post‘s Philip P. Pan had an excellent story today on the ways in which Russia used economic coercion to aid and abet regime change in Kyrgyzstan last week. This part stands out in particular: After the opposition announced plans for nationwide protests, Putin provided a final spark by signing a decree March 29 ...
The Washington Post's Philip P. Pan had an excellent story today on the ways in which Russia used economic coercion to aid and abet regime change in Kyrgyzstan last week. This part stands out in particular:
The Washington Post‘s Philip P. Pan had an excellent story today on the ways in which Russia used economic coercion to aid and abet regime change in Kyrgyzstan last week. This part stands out in particular:
After the opposition announced plans for nationwide protests, Putin provided a final spark by signing a decree March 29 eliminating subsidies on gasoline exports to Kyrgyzstan and other former Soviet republics that had not joined a new customs union.
When the tariffs kicked in April 1, Russian fuel shipments to Kyrgyzstan were suspended, said Bazarbai Mambetov, president of a Kyrgyz oil traders association. Within days, gas prices in Bishkek began to climb, enraging residents already angry about sharp increases in utility fees.
As the Kremlin leaned on Bakiyev, it also consulted the opposition, hosting its leaders on visits to Moscow, including in the days before the protests. On the eve of the demonstrations, the Kyrgyz prime minister accused one, Temir Sariev, of telling police that he had met with Putin and had won his support for efforts to overthrow Bakiyev.
What’s interesting about this is that Russia didn’t rely on "smart sanctions" that would only hurt the ruling elite. They clearly imposed sanctions designed to roust the mass public into action.
Sometimes, dumb sanctions aren’t actually all that dumb.
[So you’re saying that similar sanctions should be imposed against Iran?–ed. No. Iran is not Kyrgyzstan, and the United States is not Russia. There are too many differences between the two cases to make that facile comparison. I’m just pointing out that there is more than one way for sanctions to change a targeted state’s behavior.]
Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and co-host of the Space the Nation podcast. Twitter: @dandrezner
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