The Petraeus move was a good step, but what’s the game plan?

Replacing General McChrystal with General Petraeus was a shrewd tactical move by President Obama, but I worry about its larger operational and strategic implications.

Tactically, it cauterized the Afghanistan wound that the Rolling Stone interview had opened (or, perhaps more accurately, opened up to public scrutiny). It replaced one war hero with another war hero; one general who had contributed to a successful surge with another general who had led that successful surge; one general who had pledged support for Obama’s timeline with another general who had pledged support (albeit with caveats) to the timeline;  the only person on the team that our local partners trusted with the only other person on the team who might earn their trust.

It also reaffirmed some essential democratic principles: civilian supremacy, military respect for higher authority, and the awkward truth that no one is indispensable. In delivering the blow, President Obama offered some gracious words of praise for McChrystal’s heroic record of service, and some very well-crafted remarks about the nature of healthy civil-military relations. It was, in short, a high-water mark for Obama as commander in chief.

If President Obama’s only problem was how to deal with a great fighter who cultivated a poor command climate and was careless in his media relations, then the problem is solved – and deftly so.

But operationally, I fear Obama’s problems are greater and that the Petraeus-for-McChrystal swap is an insufficient step. Operationally, the problem is that McChrystal’s intemperate statements about his colleagues were impolitic but accurate. The occasion called for a more extensive housecleaning than Obama performed.  Obama punished the one guy caught on tape, not the others on the team that were underperforming.

Yes, Obama in his statement reaffirmed the importance of unity of effort.  Yes, Obama said he "won’t tolerate division."  But so far as we know, nothing else was done to fix the other problems.  Petraeus may well prove a more deft and diplomatic bureaucratic operator than McChrystal, but Obama did not set him up for success with the clean sweep that was warranted.

And strategically, I worry that Obama has robbed Peter to pay Paul — increased the risks in Iraq and Iran in order to reduce the risks in Afghanistan. As Centcom commander, Petraeus was the senior military officer watching Iraq. Given the administration’s rush to declare mission accomplished there, one might say that Petraeus was the only senior member of the Obama national security team who seemed to understand just how fragile was the hard-won progress in that critical country. Likewise, Petraeus’ reputation probably bought us a non-trivial margin of credibility on the pressure track with Iran. Weakening the pressure track weakens our diplomatic leverage and hastens the day we will confront an Iranian nuclear weapon. Viewed this way, the appointment of Petraeus may be less important than the appointment of Petraeus’ successor.

These operational and strategic concerns could all be addressed in future action by the administration. Obama has bought himself some time to take those steps. Whether or not the Petraeus gambit was brilliant or merely shrewd will depend on whether he takes those steps.