The Israel-Turkey fiasco can still be fixed

The fallout from the ill-fated May 31 Israeli Navy commando raid on the Mavi Marmara, the Turkish-registered ship that sought to run the blockade of Gaza, has yet to run its course. Having already withdrawn its ambassador and terminated military exercises with Israel in retaliation for the assault that included nine Turkish citizens among the 19 dead and dozens that were wounded, the government of Recep Erdogan this week announced that it has closed its airspace to Israeli military aircraft. The first plane to be denied overflight rights was a cargo plane that was ferrying Israeli officers to Poland for a visit to the Auschwitz death camp. No one could miss the symbolism of the latest Turkish move.

Erdogan insists that Israel must apologize for its actions, must compensate the families of the victims, must agree to an independent — that is, non-Israeli — investigation of the incident, and must lift the blockade of Gaza. Yet he knows full well that in the aftermath of the Goldstone report, Israel will place no trust in any investigation over which it has no say, and that it certainly is not about to permit any and everything to enter the territory controlled by an enemy that seeks its complete annihilation.

Israel’s defenders argue that Erdogan is simply seizing on the raid as a pretext to distance increasingly Islamist Turkey form Israel. Certainly Ankara continues to move closer to the Arab world and Iran, even as Europe’s financial crisis represents the end of the road for Turkish membership of the EU. Moreover, with the United States and NATO enmeshed in an increasingly unpopular war in Muslim Afghanistan, and with Europe equally critical of Israel, there appears to be even less incentive for Turkey to give the Israelis any slack just because that is what Washington would prefer.

There can be little doubt that the Israelis botched the operation; they are mistaken to think it could have been finessed with better PR. Why the raid was undertaken before daylight, when reconnaissance would have aided the commandos; why it had to take place outside Israel’s 20 mile exclusion zone, when at least the issue of international waters could have been sidestepped; why — if Israel suspected the IHH sponsors of the flotilla to have terrorist ties — the Israelis believed they would face no opposition when they boarded, are questions that have yet to be fully answered. And smoother PR will not answer them.

Erdogan therefore has a case — after all, nine of his citizens were killed — but he is overplaying his hand. In the short run, his tilt away from Israel will gain him more popularity in Turkey. In the longer run, the loss of Israeli intelligence support (which helped Turkey nab the PKK’s Ocalan), of military cooperation, and of Israeli trade and tourism will not be offset by closer ties to Iran and Syria. Both of those countries really have very little that is of tangible military or economic utility to a G-20 state like Turkey. In fact, Iran’s nuclear ambitions can only spook the Turks, while Syria is hardly anyone’s image of a reliable ally.

The Obama administration naturally is consumed by other matters: the fallout from the McChrystal affair and other ongoing Afghan troubles, the transition in Iraq, and domestic economic woes that don’t seem to get better. But strategically, the Turkish-Israeli alliance anchored the Eastern Mediterranean for the United States. Washington needs to work tirelessly to get those two very bloody minded prime ministers, Erdogan and Netanyahu, to find a way to give each other something to work with, so that the tattered but not yet ruptured relationship between their two countries can slowly be mended. The administration has many "top" priorities, but this one should be one of them.