Wanat: the families respond (II)

Here is another comment from a parent of a soldier lost at Wanat. I do not regard this as bellyaching. These people deserve, at the very least, straight answers. Instead I think their grief is intensified by what they regard as a Pentagon runaround.

This note is from retired Army Col. David Brostrom:

My wife and I entered the briefing without any preconcieved notions of who was to blame for the Wanat debacle.  Despite all of the media attention and armchair quarterbacking we knew that our accusations of negligence could be proven false — in fact,some were.  That is why the family members requested an independent investigation to determine without prejudice and influence from Army culture the lessons learned and leadership accountability. General Petraeus’s independent investigation into the Battle of Wanat was very detailed and unbiased. In the end it found three officers guilty of dereliction of duty with numerous other findings to improve combat operations in Afghanistan.  

The UCMJ process required the Service who the accused individuals serve under to carry out the recommendations of the independent investigation. General Campbell admitted he conducted in his terms a overarching reinvestigation that questioned every facet of the CENTCOM’s findings and recommendations. General Campbell by the UCMJ was the Judge, Jury, Prosecution and Defense. However, General Campbell limited his questioning to only the three officers accused of dereliction of duty and the evidence they presented in their behalf.  This evidence included letters from Army General Officers who had served in Afghanistan and who knew the three accused officers. General Campbell did not talk to any of the surviving enlisted or NCO’s who fought in the battle. At the end of the day General Campbell, who has not seen combat since Vietnam, lost sight of the real issue — the soldiers who fought and died at Wanat.  

General Campbell disagreed with General Petraeus and determined that the critical items required for success at Wanat such as water, defensive material, engineers and even leadership oversight were, in his words, "REASONABLE," given the overall Economy of Force mission, terrain and limited resources in Afghanistan.  General Campbell said it was REASONABLE for the Company Commander to have decided to do paperwork back at the Battalion Headquarters even though his primary place of duty should have been at Wanat.  It was REASONABLE for the Battalion Commander to focus on escorting and getting "face time" with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than leading a very complex Battalion level "Operation Rock Move" which included the occupaton of Wanat and which, in writing, was the main effort of the Company, Battalion and Brigade.  It was a REASONABLE decision to occupy Wanat with one platoon of infantry despite a similar mission conducted by a sister battalion months prior that used 8 platoons to occupy terrain similar to Wanat.  Despite the sacrifices, lives lost and destruction of a key village it was REASONABLE to abandon Wanat after the battle given the scarcity of resources.  General Campbell never once addressed these questions: "Was it absolutely necessary that Wanat be occupied given the economy of force mission, terrain and obvious scarcity of resources? Did the Battalion and Brigade allow themselves to become overextended, continuously putting their soldiers in unduly high-risk situations?"  

At the end of his briefing General Campbell insulted family members by telling us that his investigation was not about the 9 soldiers dead and 27 wounded, that it was much bigger Army issue.  His mission was to ensure commanders in combat would not be open to scrutiny for decisions made in the heat of battle, thus avoiding a culture of becoming too risk averse.  This last comment was not only insensitive but clearly indicated that General Campbell was influenced by other Army general officers with the specific intent of defeating any precedent that enables family members or agencies to question decisions made in combat. A few months prior — before General Campbell had made his decision — the TRADOC Commander, General Dempsey, visited an officers career course at Fort Sill and asked a student body consisting of Captains what they felt of being scrutinized for decisions made in combat and if it would make them too risk averse. Words and intent used in the TRADOC Commander’s speech were almost verbatim to what General Campbell told the family members.  At the end of the brief, General Campbell clearly gave the family members the perception that the Army had manipulated the UCMJ system in order to come up with the answer that was good for the Army.

Senator Webb was correct in his press statement: ‘I find the Army’s decision deeply troubling that the Army has exonerated these officers and in the process rejected the findings of the independent review. This development raises concerns regarding the principle of command accountability in the Army.’

My personal opinion is that the Army’s decision reinforces failure and arrogance in commanders. The Army has ignored that there are conditions that must be studied and identified that create serious leadership and staff failures at the Battalion and Brigade.  These failures led to the incidences at Wanat and others such COP Keating.  Also the Army’s decision in a indirect way blatantly belittles the basic authority of our civilian leadership over the U.S. Armed Forces."