Postmortem on Iran sanctions

With conversation in Washington turning back to the possibility of military strikes against Iran, it’s worth asking what value there was in the months-long push for new sanctions. There are those who believe Iran may yet buckle under the weight of UN, U.S., and EU economic pressure. But the weight of opinion remains skeptical. And if that’s correct, it’s fair to ask what the scheming, maneuvering, and vote-counting that consumed diplomats for several months was worth. Did that messy exercise in multilateralism have any value? Below are some theories on that question:

1. There was no other option: Israel doesn’t have the military wherewithal to do to Iran’s program what it did to Syria’s (and Iraq’s before that). Even U.S. strikes are not certain to destroy hidden and buried facilities, but they are certain to inflame the region and endanger U.S. and international forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. So even if the chance that sanctions would be effective was vanishingly small, they were worth a shot.

2. Delay and Complicate: Sanctions may not have changed the minds of the mullahs but at least they have made cobbling together a full nuclear weapons program more difficult. Iran has to worry that imports of necessary parts and technologies will be seized, and the UN resolution gave added authority to those countries able and inclined to sniff around suspicious cargo. In effect, sanctions have ratcheted up the costs for those involved in helping Tehran get the bomb and perhaps slowed the process down by a matter of months. And those months could be precious. The simmering discontent with the regime could boil over at any point, leading to regime change and (likely) a new nuclear policy. Sometimes, kicking the can down the road is good policy.

3. Great Power Team-Building: In my book on the Security Council, I argue that one of the often overlooked values of the Security Council is that it can help keep the major powers in touch with each other, aware of each other’s sensitivities and interests, and that it can help drag out potential international crises, giving the big powers time to adjust their expectations and figure out face-saving exit strategies. The perceived need for Council consultation acts like a speed brake on international crises. Yes, Iran getting a nuclear weapon is undesirable, but ratcheting up big-power tension and possibly even sparking a great-power crisis by ignoring the Council would be much worse. So if consultation helped to keep Moscow, Washington, Beijing, London, Paris, Brasilia, Ankara, Mexico City, and Tokyo (to name just the biggest players) on the same page—that’s valuable. And by respecting the Council process, Washington may have made it tougher for other countries inclined to unilateralism to ignore it later.

4. Laying the Moral Groundwork: For those more sanguine about the military option, the sanctions dance might have helped show the world that any eventual military strike was the last resort. Flash forward to spring 2011. U.S. bombers have just returned from the first of a series of strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. "Four times we went to the UN for sanctions," President Obama could tell the world as he announces the strikes, "and four times Iran defied the international community." For key U.S. allies and for some portion of world public opinion, that effort may make a difference.

 5. Preventing Copycats: Nonproliferation isn’t just about Iran. Even if the sanctions were never going to alter Tehran’s plans, the spectacle of its international condemnation and isolation might have changed minds in other places.   

6. Dangerous Distraction: The above theories all posit that, however meager the results, Security Council diplomacy had some value. But what if it was counterproductive? Some dissidents claim sanctions have strengthened hardliners in Tehran.  And the intense focus on process in New York may have distracted and deluded Western policymakers. Presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers got so focused on securing an additional resolution that they stopped asking whether it would do any good.  Meanwhile, the regime has inched closer to the bomb.