Russia returns to Afghanistan

The controversial October 28 joint Russian-U.S.-Afghan counternarcotics raid may be a sign that, after extensive disagreement about drug interdiction policies in Afghanistan, Moscow and NATO have found a way to narrow their differences. The operation marked the first time that Russian agents had joined their Afghan, American, and other NATO counterparts in such an airborne raid, which in this case destroyed four narcotics laboratories in Nangarhar province. The Russian government estimated the street value of the drugs destroyed at $250,000. U.S. officials, however, gave a considerably lower figure.

The flood of opium entering Russia from Afghanistan has emerged as a major source of tension between Moscow and NATO, as Russian officials blame the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan for failing to curb that country’s exploding opium production. Russian officials have been lobbying especially hard for the aerial spraying of herbicides to eradicate Afghanistan’s opium poppy.

NATO governments have made clear their reluctance to meet Russian demands to eradicate the opium crops through aerial spraying of poppy or other actions against individual Afghan farmers. They fear that such direct action against large numbers of Afghans would prove a public relations disaster, alienating Afghans and facilitating Taliban recruitment.

However, following a formal change in U.S. policy announced in June 2009, ISAF forces have focused their efforts on destroying large warehouses storing illicit drugs as well as interdicting the flow of narcotics out of Afghanistan and the drug money that the Taliban uses to finance its operations, a policy more in line with long-standing Russian requests of NATO. In an interview with the author in Washington last month, Victor Ivanov, the head of Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN), stressed that, "Laboratories are a fundamental issue. This is precisely where narcotics processing occurs…. The farmers in the fields are not organized crime, but slaves. But laboratories – this is organized crime."

Despite the condemnation of Russian involvement in the raid by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Russian officials celebrated it as a new step in Russian-U.S. relations. In a news conference run by government-supported RIA Novosti news agency, Ivanov described his agency as having played a major role in the raid, which he said "shows that there are real actions being taken amid the reset in relations between Russia and the United States." Other Russian officials besides Ivanov have applauded the expanded Russian-U.S. cooperation against Afghan narcotics and expressed hope it would continue.

On the sidelines of the October 30 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Hanoi. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced  that his government "expressed pleasure at the successful joint operation to fight drug trafficking in Afghanistan," and noted that it is an example worth following. Lavrov added that, "[The United States and Russia] have agreed to continue the fight against drugs."

Russian officials reacted with surprise when President Karzai subsequently denounced the operation for allegedly occurring without his government’s permission. An anonymous Kremlin official stated that "we were in favor of the operation being conducted, but technically, we did not participate in it." Other Russian officials also described the role of the handful of Russian counternarcotics agents present as simply observers.

Given the dysfunctional nature of government bureaucracies, it cannot be excluded that the Afghan interior ministry officials involved in the operation had neglected to inform their superiors about the mission’s details, such as the involvement of the Russians. When asked at a news conference whether Russians had participated in the raid, Baz Mohammed Ahmad, the Deputy Minister of Counternarcotics, evasively responded that, "We did not ask them where they were from, and they all look the same, and we were not informed that two Russian drug specialists had also participated in this operation."

Still, the most plausible explanation is that Karzai was trying to distance himself from the controversial presence of Russian security forces on Afghanistan’s territory. Like many Russians, Afghans look back on the period of Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan with horror and would not welcome a renewed Russian military presence in the country.

However, it appears that the raid did not provoke a huge reaction amongst Afghans, and after Ivanov made clear that Russia only wanted (with Afghan permission) to send a few drug control agents along in multinational counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan under Kabul’s leadership, Karzai relented and reached what Ivanov described as a "mutual understanding"l that such operations could occur. In his initial press conference describing the October 28 raid, Ivanov related that he had signed an agreement while in Washington authorizing such joint counternarcotics operations. Karzai’s stance will soon become clearer as he responds to Ivanov’s request to deploy more FSKN agents on the ground in Afghanistan. They would join the approximately 100 American counternarcotics specialist currently based in Afghanistan.

Another possibility is that Karzai, who depends on cooperation from local elites (even if they are warlords or drug lords) to exercise power outside of Kabul, did not want to see foreign forces conduct independent operations against his regional allies. Before the raid, U.S. officials had indicated that the narcotics and other organized criminal activities in Nangarhar were so extensive that they likely enjoyed the protection of influential local officials.

The dispute may also have been yet one of many conflicts between Karzai and Western governments, who have shown increased impatience at the limited progress the Afghan government has been making in introducing necessary economic and political reforms. Karzai does not respond well to criticism, and has been periodically vented his anger at Western governments, most recently over their use of foreign rather than Afghan private security contractors.

While the U.S. military leaves it to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and other law enforcement agencies to deal with most drug dealers, it can attack narcotics dealers when sufficient evidence exists that their profits fund terrorism. The U.S. "kill or capture" list of targets against which U.S. commanders can use deadly force without additional approval includes dozens of high-level drug traffickers whose operations are thought to finance the Taliban.

More recently, The United States Treasury has begun designating prominent Afghan drug lords whose networks provide substantial financial and logistical support to the Taliban as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, freezing their assets and prohibiting U.S. persons (including business institutions) from dealing with them.

Attacking more narcotics laboratories represents a logical extension of these operations. As Ivanov made clear in his interview with the author, the Russian government has considerable intelligence about the location and activities of narcotics laboratories in Afghanistan. If U.S. and NATO forces are going to make a major effort to destroy these facilities, then drawing on Russian expertise makes considerable sense. Furthermore, the enhanced collaboration against Afghan drug labs, while possibly disrupting some drug trafficking networks through Russia, could still contribute to improving Russian-NATO ties on other issues.

Richard Weitz is a senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute.