Reset, Redux: Charap and Petersen respond

In a post here last week, I offered some critical thoughts on the “reset” philosophy of U.S.-Russia relations, as embodied at a recent panel discussion in Washington by Samuel Charap, associate director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for American Progress, and Alexandros Petersen, a senior fellow with the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council. Charap and Petersen asked to respond — their rebuttal follows.

We were glad to see that Steve LeVine took the time to watch the entire event his recent post discusses, and even more pleased that he offered us the opportunity to respond to the post on his excellent blog. The purpose of our recent writings under the banner of “Reimagining Eurasia” was in part to spark debate about U.S. policy in the region.

But an accurate portrayal of our argument is a necessary starting point for a debate. Unfortunately, Steve’s post mischaracterizes our argument.

We did not set out to disparage or support Clinton, Bush or Obama policy toward Russia or Russia’s neighbors — the former Soviet countries of the greater Black Sea region and Central Asia we refer to as Eurasia. Reimagining Eurasia is not about arguing in favor of the Russia “reset,” and it is most certainly not about throwing any Eurasian country under any proverbial buses. Quite the opposite, in fact.

Reimagining Eurasia is about more accurately appraising the diverse states of the region, as a necessary step towards greater sophistication in U.S. policy. We’re calling for policymakers and analysts to appreciate nuance in regional dynamics and develop more effective ways for Washington to engage.

It is perhaps for this reason that our original Foreign Affairs article, three related pieces, and subsequent event at the Center for American Progress were well received by both those who oppose the Obama administration’s “Russia reset” and those who support it. Indeed, we ourselves sometimes differ on the prudence of the current administration’s policies toward Moscow.

It is worth reiterating our concept’s three basic principles:

First, U.S. policy toward Eurasian countries should be predicated on their respective merits, not their value as bargaining chips or their relationships with other countries. Policy makers and analysts should start with the basic question of what American interests are at stake in a given bilateral relationship. That should also mean paying little attention to leaders’ pronouncements of geopolitical loyalty.

Second, the United States should broaden engagement with the states of the region, using all of the tools in the toolbox, not just in terms of security and natural resources, but diplomatically, economically and culturally.

Finally, U.S. policy should emphasize transparency and win-win opportunities, while simultaneously rejecting Russian notions of “spheres of influence” and antiquated zero-sum arguments from the Eurasian governments themselves.

Our premise is therefore not an assessment of past U.S. policy.

Nor does it involve “rash judgments about Russia’s trustworthiness.” Indeed, many who have responded to our ideas have noted Russia’s far-from-model-neighbor approach to the Eurasian states. Some say Moscow’s approach will forever be zero-sum, and therefore the U.S. and its Western partners should play a renewed “Great Game” in order to retain influence in Eurasia — we must push back wherever Russia pushes forward. Others argue the costs of playing the Great Game are too high, and the upside too unclear and therefore the West should stop playing in Russia’s (and increasingly China’s) backyard.

Neither of these conclusions lead to useful policy recommendations for U.S. engagement in a region wherein it cannot (and should not) directly compete with Russia (or China), but wherein it must nonetheless boost its influence due to the region’s immense strategic importance, growing economic opportunities, and its democratic deficit and the transnational threats that emanate from it.

This false dichotomy — either play the Great Game, or throw in the towel — likely explains the dearth of effective U.S. Eurasia strategy. It is this framework that surrounds the current discussion about Kyrgyzstan almost exclusively in the context of whether Russia is trying to displace our base there.

In fact, the international political angle to this year’s unrest in Kyrgyzstan was one of U.S.-Russia cooperation. Instead of indulging in geopolitical gamesmanship as usual, Russia and the United States actually worked together, pursuing back-channel talks that facilitated former president Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s safe escape into exile. Periodic consultations since April have thus far managed to prevent conflict between the Cold War adversaries in the one country where both have military outposts and even helped in the coordination of humanitarian aid.

Recounting these facts does not mean we believe Russia to have transformed into an enlightened, constructive actor in its neighborhood – far from it. However, it does show that Russia is capable of playing roles other than the neighborhood goon. Indeed, Russia will always be a player in this part of the world; the question is what kind of player. The challenge for the U.S. is to incentivize and encourage constructive behavior, and a functioning relationship with Moscow combined with transparency about policy in the region can go a long way to that end.

In any case, our proposed approach for U.S. policy toward Russia’s neighbors does not jettison geopolitics. In fact, over the long run, substantive U.S. relationships with the states of the region predicated on their respective particular circumstances will garner the U.S. far more influence than that gained through a policy of push and pull with other great powers over the heads of the region’s governments and people.

Reimagining Eurasia drives a conceptual wedge through the current false dichotomy of Washington’s debate about policy in the region. It presents a blueprint for a workable and enduring foreign policy strategy. We look forward to continuing a debate about its merits.

— Samuel Charap and Alexandros Petersen