The diplomats’ guide to planning a walkout of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s U.N. speech
The scene looks predictable enough to anyone with passing interest in the United Nations. Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, pays his annual visit to the U.N. General Assembly, takes a few swipes at the U.S. and Israel, American and European diplomats walk out in protest, and the media plays up the clash. But who knew that ...
The scene looks predictable enough to anyone with passing interest in the United Nations.
The scene looks predictable enough to anyone with passing interest in the United Nations.
Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, pays his annual visit to the U.N. General Assembly, takes a few swipes at the U.S. and Israel, American and European diplomats walk out in protest, and the media plays up the clash.
But who knew that the effort to stage a boycott of a U.N. General Assembly speech was so difficult to pull off. In a September 25, 2009, meeting with U.S. diplomats in Stockholm, a Swedish diplomat admited that his government had declined to participate in a walkout a day earlier by U.S. and other key European diplomats.
Ulf Samuelsson, the Swedish desk officer for Iran, told his American counterpart, that the "red lines" agreed on by the 27 members of the European Union–the denial of the Holocaust or the of the right of Israel to exist–had never been crossed during the speech, according to a U.S. cable of the meeting published by WikiLeaks. To the dismay of the Swedes, who held the EU presidency in 2009, Britain, France and Germany got up and left the U.N. general assembly hall after Ahmadinejad said something merely offensive.
The lack of European coordination was particularly "embarrasing" for Sweden’s political director, Bjorn Lyrvall, the man responsible for giving the green light for the walk out, another Swedish diplomat, Andres Jato, told the Americans. "Lyrvall was listening "outside with headphones on," ready to give the "pre-arranged signal" for all EU reps to walk out," according to the U.S. cable. "He was "surprised" when he saw first the Germans and then other EU delegations stream past him without the agreed upon red lines having been crossed. "We look like we can’t coordinate anything," Jato lamented."
Samuelsson, meanwhile, noted that Sweden never really thought much of the boycott. "Sweden is, in general, uncomfortable with using walk-outs as a punitive tool in UNGA. Samuelsson added that were Sweden to use the tool "equally" it would have walked out on a number of leaders’ objectionable/heinous statements at UNGA. Sweden would rather respond in other ways to objectionable/heinous satatements at UNGA."
Follow me on Twitter @columlynch
Colum Lynch was a staff writer at Foreign Policy between 2010 and 2022. Twitter: @columlynch
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