Do Tunisia and Egypt mark the beginning of a new chapter for Obama in the Middle East?

The Obama administration has thus far been pitch perfect in its public statements regarding the unrest in Egypt. Learning from its ill-considered silence in the early days of the Iranian protests, it has offered a balanced message. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton got it exactly right with "the Egyptian government has an important opportunity … to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people." And Robert Gibbs’s deft "Egypt is a strong ally" sent the unmistakable message that our long-term interests lie with the Egyptian people and not with any particular individual or leadership group … while at the same time reflecting an appreciation for embattled, aging Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s past cooperation with the United States.

That said, the uprisings in Egypt also signal a new period in the administration’s foreign policy that will pose conundrums that make the riddle of the Sphinx look like a snap in comparison.

The complex challenges are, of course, hinted at in the choice the United States faces with regard to the Egyptian turmoil. The student uprisings raise the prospect of a more representative government in the country … and also the possibility that the uprisings we saw in Iran and then in Tunisia that preceded the Egyptian events might signal a moment of generational transition that could remake the region’s politics. But they also raise the possibility of instability and of the uprisings being co-opted either by hard-liners who use them as an excuse to clamp down or by other even more radical, fundamentalist elements who seize on the upheaval to make their own moves.

In short, while supporting "people power" sometimes leads to profound change and more democratic institutions as it did from the Philippines to Eastern Europe in the 1980s, it can also lead to crackdowns, further entrenchment of autocrats, instability, weak new regimes, and even the rise of more threatening or unpredictable leaders. And in all those negative cases, if you have appeared to bet on the wrong side the diplomatic consequences can be unfortunate.

It is all made somewhat more complicated by the nature of the countries where such upheavals seem to be most likely in the immediate future. Beyond Egypt, it is possible to imagine uprisings of one sort or another in places where we have seen them in the past, like Iran, in places facing political crises at the moment, like Lebanon, in places with weak governments and extreme social pressure, like Pakistan, Iraq, or Afghanistan, or in places that might someday face succession problems like Saudi Arabia or Jordan.

All these situations are very different. But in each case, should problems arise, the Obama administration is going to have to ask: What is more important to us, short-term stability or being on the right side of history, more dependable counterparts or democracy? Does Barack Obama want to be seen as the man who helped extricate the United States from the region by helping to put a lid on its problems through supporting strongman governments, or does he want to take the risks associated with ushering in a new era in the region … which, despite generational change and the galvanizing power of new technologies, itself seems a very long shot given the region’s history?

These tough choices are in turn linked to others in the region that are equally or more daunting. As Obama fulfills his goals of getting the United States out of Iraq, beginning the withdrawal from Afghanistan (which he is likely to approach with an ever greater sense of urgency), what happens when other parts of the region produce instability that poses the question: Should the United States intervene in some way? What if a future terror attack is traced to countries from which we are withdrawing or from which we have largely withdrawn? Or what if such an attack is traced to Yemen or al Qaeda in North Africa or to Sudan? What if the responsibility for action lies entirely on Obama’s shoulders and is no longer a question of following through on an inherited legacy?

Obama has made great progress in the Middle East at large, comments about what he did and did not mention in his State of the Union notwithstanding. He has met his goals in Iraq, which many seem to have already forgotten was the dominant issue of the preceding decade. He has made some apparent progress in slowing Iran’s nuclear program. He is committed to starting to drawn down forces in Afghanistan this year. He has certainly improved U.S. relations in the region. He has made an effort with Israel and the Palestinians, and while results have been thin, he deserves points for trying. He and his team led by Secretary Clinton have even started to master some of the tricky nuances of taking diplomatic stances while navigating the diplomatic quicksand of the region at large.

But it is clear that despite the formidable nature of all these challenges, far greater ones lie ahead. This next generation of problems are ones in which the solutions will test the president and bear the mark of his true character as a leader more than anything that has come thus far.