Rethinking nuclear deterrence

The four statesmen of the nuclear age are back with a new op-ed in The Wall Street Journal, published today, suggesting that we take some of the nuclear out of nuclear deterrence. The piece is signed by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, who have jointly authored earlier op-eds calling for measures to reduce the nuclear danger.

Their new piece follows a conference last fall at the Hoover Institution on ways to establish deterrence with fewer nuclear weapons, or, eventually, with the elimination of them. It’s a looming problem, worthy of some hard thinking. No one has come up with an easy and quick substitute for nuclear deterrence, which we’ve maintained for decades. At the same time, we can’t go on forever relying on method for insuring security that was invented for the Cold War. It is outmoded and risky and does not deter some of the most potent threats that exist today. I wrote about this recently in The Independent of London.

As mentioned in an earlier FP article, what’s interesting about these four is that they all had deep experience in the earlier era of Mutual Assured Destruction, known as MAD. They were wise men of the atomic age, and now they are thinking about how to exit that epoch.

Their new piece is not the last word on this–a lot of details remain to be sketched in–but is a welcome attempt to broach the subject of what comes after MAD.

Here’s the essence of their article:

The first step is to recognize that there is a daunting new spectrum of global security threats. These threats include chemical, biological and radiological weapons, catastrophic terrorism and cyber warfare, as well as natural disasters resulting from climate change or other environmental problems, and health-related crises. For the United States and many other nations, existential threats relating to the very survival of the state have diminished, largely because of the end of the Cold War and the increasing realization that our common interests greatly exceed our differences. However, an accident or mistake involving nuclear weapons, or nuclear terrorism fueled by the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear know-how, is still a very real risk. An effective strategy to deal with these dangers must be developed.

The second step is the realization that continued reliance on nuclear weapons as the principal element for deterrence is encouraging, or at least excusing, the spread of these weapons, and will inevitably erode the essential cooperation necessary to avoid proliferation, protect nuclear materials and deal effectively with new threats.

Third, the U.S. and Russia have no basis for maintaining a structure of deterrence involving nuclear weapons deployed in ways that increase the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon, or even a deliberate nuclear exchange based on a false warning. Reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles with verification to the levels set by the New Start Treaty is an important step in reducing nuclear risks. Deeper nuclear reductions and changes in nuclear force posture involving the two nations should remain a priority. Further steps must include short-range tactical nuclear weapons.

The full article is behind a WSJ paywall. Here’s a link. It goes on to address some of the problems of a nuclear build-down.

Update: The full text (in a .pdf) can be found at the Nuclear Threat Initiative.