The big question in Libya: Not why, what, or how, but who?

While legitimate discussions are taking place on both sides of the Atlantic (and the Mediterranean for that matter) about what the goal should be for coalition forces in Libya, how those goals should be achieved, and why outside forces are in the country in the first place, perhaps the most important discussion ought to be who we are fighting on behalf of and along side of. This is not a reference to the shifting contours of the coalition or the fact that the French occasionally act French. Rather it is a question about who our allies are among the Libyan rebel forces. Because persuade ourselves as we might that we are intervening on behalf of the people of Libya to protect them from their demented dictator, at the end of the day, if that dictator falls, some government will have to replace him and right now various actors are positioning themselves to take advantage of the void that may be created.

In recent days, various people have posed questions about this group or the political processes that may follow this rebellion. They include…

The always perceptive Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic:

Do we really know who would rule Libya if Qaddafi disappeared from the scene? I met a whole bunch of anti-Qaddafi activists in Cairo last week, and they didn’t fill me with good feeling about their intentions or their beliefs. Or, for that matter, their competence. I know that there are many brave people among the opposition, and I wish fervently for their success, on the theory that they can’t be worse than Qaddafi. But I’m not one hundred percent behind this theory.

And Caroline Glick in the Jerusalem Post:

Under jihadist commander Abu Yahya Al- Libi, Libyan jihadists staged anti-regime uprisings in the mid-1990s. Like today, those uprisings’ central hubs were Benghazi and Darnah.

In 2007 Al-Libi merged his forces into al- Qaida. On March 18, while denouncing the US, France and Britain, Al-Libi called on his forces to overthrow Gaddafi.

A 2007 US Military Academy study of information on al-Qaida forces in Iraq indicate that by far, Eastern Libya made the largest per capita contribution to al-Qaida forces in Iraq.

Veteran Middle East watchers might see Goldberg and Glick as actively pro-Israel voices who are articulating the Israeli view toward the regions recent turmoil which has been, roughly translated from the Hebrew, "don’t rock the boat." As tough as the neighborhood is, many Israelis fear efforts at regime change may only make it worse. But it is not only members of this camp that worry about whose march to Tripoli we are enabling. Evan Perez recently wrote in the Wall Street Journal that "U.S. counter-terrorism officials are wary that al Qaeda affiliates in North Africa could try take advantage of the upheaval in Libya, seeking a new foothold, said John Brennan, the top White House counter-terrorism official." This jibes with buzz from the White House that for just this reason Brennan and others in the intel community were skeptical of intervention in Libya, articulating the view that sometimes when you stir up a hornet’s nest you just get stung.

I find myself in the camp that believes the people of Libya did deserve international protection from Qaddafi, that it should have come much earlier, and that the current operation has been bedeviled by the worst elements of leadership by committee. Having said that, with the prospect of a more extended, costly, risky endeavor to follow through and produce regime change not only on the horizon but being driven by a very real sense that this operation will be a failure if Qaddafi remains in office, I hope we are taking sufficient care to ensure that we are not going to end up with a worse, more dangerous Libya than we started out with.