Mideast news brief: Rebels’ use of tanks may have caused misfire; NATO will not apologize

People attend the weekly friday demonstration against corruption, unemployment and poor public services in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square on April 8, 2011 (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images).

Arguments & Analysis  

“There are promises that the 48-year-old state of emergency will soon be lifted but that depends on replacing it with a new anti-terrorism law — which could turn out to be almost as bad. The Mubarak regime in Egypt made similar promises over a period of years but its draft anti-terrorism law was heavily criticized by a UN special rapporteur and the emergency was still in place when the regime fell. Opening up the system to new political parties is another promise on the table but, again, a lot will depend on how this might be implemented. Most of the Arab countries that allow multiple parties have a lot of restrictions to keep them from winning power and it’s doubtful whether Syria, considering the regime’s control-freak mentality, would be any different. Also, there is little point in anyone forming a political party and seeking to win seats in parliament when the parliament itself is a rubber-stamp body with next to no power. To change that, Syria needs a thorough overhaul of its constitution, something which does not appear to be on offer at the moment. The crucial question — which may be answered on the streets in the next few days — is how many Syrians believe that Assad is serious about change and able to implement it. They are already long-accustomed to government announcements of reform but less accustomed to seeing them put into practice.”

“[Saudi Arabia] presents the Obama administration with a particularly thorny dilemma…[it] is the world’s largest oil producer and the only one with sufficient excess production capacity to moderate rises in the price of oil. Instability in Saudi Arabia could produce panic in the oil markets and an oil shock that could put an end to America’s economic recovery (and the president’s hopes for reelection). This would argue for granting an “exception” to Saudi Arabia from the Obama administration’s trumpeting of universal rights. Indeed, the soft criticism of Bahrain’s Saudi-dictated suppression of its people suggests that this has already become U.S. policy.

Yet helping the Saudi king effectively erect a wall against the political tsunami sweeping across the Arab world is not a long-term solution. If there’s one thing that we can now predict with some confidence, it’s that no Arab authoritarian regime can remain immune from the demands of its people for political freedom and accountable government. To be sure, $100 billion in subventions from the palace and the promise of 60,000 jobs can help postpone, for a time, the demands of unemployed Saudi youths. But political freedom, transmitted across borders via cable TV and the Internet, has proved to be a seductive idea. In the end, it will not be assuaged by economic bribes or police-state suppression.

‘Egypt without Mubarak’ (Joshua Stacher, Middle East Report online)   

“Many Egyptians have begun to grumble about the military’s increasingly prominent role. A well-attended April 1 protest in Tahrir Square called upon Field Marshal Husayn Tantawi, Mubarak’s minster of defense, to resign from the Supreme Council and for swifter action toward putting the men of the deposed regime on trial for corruption and other offenses. On April 6, Tantawi appeared to respond to one of these demands, announcing formation of a committee to investigate Mubarak himself. Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei and other politicians associated with the revolution applauded the committee as a positive step. But Mubarak was already sacrificed to the crowds; the real test of the army’s commitment to democracy lies ahead. The March 19 referendum may have led the army to bank on a silent majority of Egyptians who will cling to the institution they have known for the past 60 years in place of the Brothers or protesters who call for further mobilization and disruption to normal life. Discontent with the military is growing, and one can expect more popular mobilizations to safeguard the revolutionary process Egyptians began by heroically overthrowing their dictator of 30 years. Yet the linchpin of the Supreme Council’s strategy seems predicated on the calculations that the center of Egyptian politics is fairly unquestioning support for the army around the country and that this center will hold. A great contest to define the center is underway and the outcome remains thoroughly uncertain. The only certainty is that, after an exhilarating spring, Egypt is in for a hot summer.”