What next after King Abdullah?

Saudi Arabia has thus far been spared the agitations for change that toppled Zine el Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak and that are now pressuring Bahraini and Yemeni leaders. King Abdullah’s popularity among the majority of Saudis accounts for much of the lack of impetus for political overhaul in the kingdom. Abdullah, however, is 87 and unhealthy. When he dies, what will happen to the country?

Instead of speculating about who might succeed Abdullah and how Saudi Arabia will change as a result, it’s more constructive to analyze how Saudi Arabia has conducted itself amidst regional unrest and understand what this says about senior Saudi leadership.

The House of Saud has been forced to make critical decisions during this watershed moment in Arab history. Although Abdullah is king, Saudi government decisions are based on a consensus among senior princes. The manner in which Saudi leadership has handled domestic and neighboring tensions — dishing out economic benefits at home and stamping out political unrest domestically and abroad — suggests that a formidable politically uncompromising and reactionary current runs through top Saudi leadership. Following this pattern, Abdullah’s successor is likely to resist political reform and stick with repression as much of the region heads on a path toward democratization.

It isn’t worth spending too much time on the "who" question, although it’s in vogue to suggest that a member of the younger generation could assume the throne following Abdullah’s passing. One of Abdullah’s half-brothers, all of whom already exert significant influence on the domestic and foreign policy decision-making process, is due to become king. Since Crown Prince Sultan is ill, all signs point to Prince Nayef, aged 78, being tapped in the coming years. There certainly was a youth movement in Tahrir Square, but there will be none in Saud’s House.

Domestically, King Abdullah has managed to stem the tide of Middle East uprisings by promising nearly $100 billion in financial handouts while simultaneously quelling the March 11 Day of Rage protests and other demonstrations. The kingdom’s response to the Arab Spring, however, has stopped well short of some Saudi citizens’ demands for political liberalization on the domestic front.

The government arrested several Saudi scholars after they attempted to establish the Umma Islamic party. It would have been the first party ever in the kingdom and an important symbol of political opening. And in a speech on March 18, King Abdullah did not mention the possibility of introducing an elected parliament. This is disappointing to many Saudis, especially the younger population. As one member of the Saudi consultative council claimed at an event at the New America Foundation last week, Saudi Arabia’s youth consider substantial political reform the "next important step" in the liberalization process.

But for now genuine political reform remains an illusion. In a recent blog post I argued that by harnessing its oil wealth Saudi Arabia can continue to keep its citizens content. While this strategy may serve the purpose of Saudi stability in the short term, it will not be sustainable. It’s easier to hand out billions of dollars in benefits than to address structural economic issues, just as it is easier to maintain effective short-term repression tactics than to grant political freedoms. The House of Saud has opted for simpler, shorter-term solutions.

As Saudi Arabia’s burgeoning youth population discovers new means of popular mobilization, and as the information revolution challenges autocrats’ monopoly over national narratives, calls for political reform will naturally proliferate and threaten Saudi Arabia’s archaic political structure. Dr. Mai Yamani, daughter of a former Saudi oil minister, claimed that Saudi’s youth see short-term financial measures as a form of bribery meant to dampen calls for political opening. Yamani argues, "What the Saudi youth are asking for is political reform."

Instead, during this period of volatility and unpredictability in the region, the Saudi kingdom has placed a premium on regime security, narrowly defined. This is Prince Nayef’s forte. In a New York Times article, Steven Lee Myers sums up the debate on Nayef: some experts label Nayef a staunch conservative who would "take the kingdom backward," while others place Nayef within the reformer camp.

Though the conservative label is overly simplistic, Nayef’s lifetime emphasis on the security imperative suggests that he may represent the interest of more conservative royals. Nayef and his son Mohammad, the deputy prime minister, have stifled terrorist attacks in the kingdom and employed both hard and soft power to control radical Islamist terrorism. They have more generally combated domestic threats against the House of Saud’s rule. Therefore, their obsession with security reflects a firm opposition to any questioning of the House of Saud’s unshared, unquestioned grip on power.

But the royal who reigns in the long term must address demands for political liberalization that will persist. The regional context makes this reality all the more clear. In Egypt and Tunisia, longstanding rulers were forced out and, if the protesters have their way, more transparent, liberal governments will emerge. Even in Syria, protesters are defying government crackdowns and threatening President Bashar Al-Assad’s once insurmountable grip on power.

Most pertinent to the issue of reform in Saudi Arabia, however, is Bahrain. In the tiny gulf state, the Khalifa royal family rules over a population cushioned by oil benefits (Bahrain derives much of its revenue by refining discounted Saudi oil). That a Sunni minority government reigns over a Shia majority only amplifies the general population’s cry for reform. The Khalifa ruling family may well concede to some of the protesters’ demands. Senior Saudi leadership, however, has demonstrated no patience for such calls.

Maintaining harsh security measures inevitably introduces a degree of brutality and injustice into the Saudi internal narrative. As nearly every state in the Arab world (including some monarchical ones) grapples with expanding transparency and accountability, Saudi Arabia’s likely successor might (but should not) adopt a strategy of repression against a youth population that is connected to global events and expects reform. In a more open regional political environment, such a strategy is unpalatable. To make maters worse, that successor will lack the political capital and popularity King Abdullah has accumulated over the years that helps account for current Saudi stability.

Furthermore, the Saudis have made certain foreign policy decisions that exemplify a preoccupation with security on an inter-state level. When Bahrain invited the Saudis to help quell unrest under the GCC cover, Saudi Arabia enthusiastically accepted by sending over a thousand troops to aid in the Bahraini government’s crackdown on activists. With Bahraini complicity, Saudi Arabia effectively exercised its domestic, Nayef-led strategy of control and security in a foreign country.

While the Bahrain case ties into the House of Saud’s domestic strategy, it may also reflect the influence more religiously conservative royals exert over foreign policy decisions. Shias comprise 60 percent of Bahrain’s population, and Saudi leadership believed sectarian tensions were in part the catalyst for Bahraini protests. Nearly 2 million Saudi Shia reside in the country’s Eastern Province, which is connected to Bahrain by a 15-mile causeway. By sending troops to Bahrain, the Saudis believed they were preempting any potential spillover of sectarian unrest into the Eastern Province.

The message: Crush any threat to Sunni fundamentalism. Throughout his reign Abdullah has shown a willingness to engage Shiites in religious dialogue and hear their socioeconomic grievances. Yet the decision to intervene in Bahrain reflects the conservative Sunni establishment’s pervasive influence on Riyadh’s decision-making and its ability to play up sectarian tensions. In the current regional environment, many young Saudis may not find this level of influence acceptable.

The last two months have demonstrated that the wave of Arab democratization is robust and real. Clamors for political reform have reached Bahrain and are sure to exert pressure on the Saudi monarchy in the future. For the time being the House of Saud’s formula of granting financial handouts for citizens while enhancing domestic security has worked. In the longer term, the royal who reigns next should address demands for political reform that will surely arise or risk jeopardizing al Saud’s grip on power.

Salman al-Rashid is a research intern at the New America Foundation and is currently pursuing a master’s degree in Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is originally from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.