From Hanoi to Tripoli: An Army general on the genuine limits of aerial firepower

Ever notice how a passage from an old book can suddenly take on new meaning? On our rainy Saturday afternoon over the weekend I was checking something in Maj. Gen. (ret.) Robert Scales’ Firepower in Limited War (rev. ed), and this paragraph on p. 98 jumped out at me:

A phenomenon of recent history has been the disturbing habit among Western nations, the United States in particular, to expect too much from aerial firepower. Perhaps this expectation has been the product of our search for a technical means to win wars without expending lives. Whatever the cause, the use of airpower in Vietnam certainly followed the historical precedent. Policymakers with an imperfect understanding of the true limitations of modern airpower concluded all too readily that those wondrously destructive weapons of aerial warfare would be able to persuade the enemy to come to terms with a minimum of human investment.

Tom again: So, while I still think that President Obama had to intervene in Libya, yeah, I understand why this air campaign is making many of my friends very nervous.  

Meanwhile, I see where veteran intelligence analyst John McCreary is growing more pessimistic: "The survival of the Benghazi regime will be nothing short of miraculous, if events continue as they have this weekend." Suddenly a stalemate doesn’t look so bad.