NATO’s not enforcing the Libyan arms embargo. Should it be?

Over at what promises to be an excellent new blog, Micah Zenko grades NATO’s performance during the Libya operation.  He gives the alliance a D on protecting civilians and only a C for facilitating humanitarian assistance. (The only good grade is for enforcement of the no-fly zone.) He finds NATO’s performance particularly lackluster in enforcing the Security Council-mandated arms embargo and slaps the alliance with a C- on that front:

NATO claims to have been totally effective in its efforts. On April 19, a Brigadier General stated, “No violation of the arms embargo has been reported.” More recently, on May 13, a Wing Commander admitted: “I have no information about arms being moved across any of the borders around Libya.” There are, however, countless reports of rebels smuggling weapons into Libya—including within supposed aid shipments.  Indeed, yesterday, NATO released this public relations video (see below), in which a Canadian ship allegedly enforcing the arms embargo, boarded a rebel tugboat, finding small arms, 105MM howitzer rounds, and “lots of explosives,” all of which are banned under Section 9 of Resolution 1970. Nevertheless, after contacting NATO Headquarters, the arms-laden tugboat is allowed to pass through to the port of Misratah.

I’m persuaded that NATO has very little interest in keeping weapons out of the hands of Libyan rebels. But here’s my question to Zenko:  Isn’t C- implementation on the embargo actually grade A strategy in terms of eventually ousting Gaddafi? Or does Zenko actually want NATO to enforce the embargo?

Micah Zenko responds:

My issue with most foreign policy debates is for policymakers to narrow the say-do gap. NATO has repeatedly claimed that there is no evidence of any arms smuggling in Libya, and that it is enforcing the arms embargo. Neither of these claims are true. If NATO decides to pick sides in the civil war, and selectively enforce an arms embargo (thus violating UNSC 1973), it should be explicit that that is now their policy.

The "say-do" gap here is primarily a function of a hastily passed UN Security Council resolution that now can’t be amended because key Council states won’t endorse regime change. And so there we are. As I see it, NATO’s choices are 1) to wink at arms flowing to the rebels while claiming the embargo is being enforced (the current policy); 2) to  state openly that NATO is in defiance of the legally-binding UN resolution; or 3) to actually enforce the embargo, thereby depriving the rebels of needed weapons.  No Western legal advisor would allow option 2, and option 3 seems to me to elevate form high above substance. Option 1 is not honest, but it’s probably the best.

These rotten choices get at a dilemma I’ve raised before. Specifically, is it better to:

a) get some kind of Security Council authorization for an intervention–even if it’s not authorizing what you want to do (regime change)–and then abuse the hell out of that authorization; or

b) bypass the Security Council? 

I think it’s an awfully close question.