TurtleLeaks: Money can’t buy you Egypt’s diplomatic love
Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama pledged more than $2 billion in debt relief and investment assistance to Egypt. But what does that money actually buy? Washington’s extension of largesse was offered in recognition of Cairo’s long-standing peace agreement with Israel and as a symbol of support for the broad trend of democratization in the ...
Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama pledged more than $2 billion in debt relief and investment assistance to Egypt.
But what does that money actually buy?
Washington’s extension of largesse was offered in recognition of Cairo’s long-standing peace agreement with Israel and as a symbol of support for the broad trend of democratization in the Arab world that began in Egypt earlier this year.
But since the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian government has launched two diplomatic initiatives that have rankled American policy makers, including making an overture to Iran, and mediating negotiations on a new Palestinian unity government that includes Hamas. At the United Nations, the new Egyptian government has shown every sign that it intends to maintain a strategic distance on the world stage from its primary financial backer.
In recent weeks, Egypt has sought to weaken American and European efforts to condemn Syria in the U.N. Human Rights Council. And Egypt, which was among the first countries to back the Palestine’s upcoming bid for diplomatic recognition in the U.N. General Assembly, has every intention of using its influence in the U.N. to maintain pressure on Israel on everything from its settlement policies to its undeclared nuclear weapons program.
Egypt’s U.N. ambassador, Maged Abdelaziz, denies that Cairo is opposed to U.S. interests in the region, telling Turtle Bay that his government intends to urge Hamas to ultimately recognize Israel and to restrain its use of violence. He also cited Washington and Cairo’s co-sponsorship of a resolution in the Human Rights Council promoting freedom of opinion and expression.
But he also conceded that on a wide range of issues, the two countries simply don’t agree.
“We have a very strategic and good relationship with the United States…and that’s not something we hide; we see eye to eye on many issues but on many other issues we don’t see eye to eye,” Abdelaziz said recently at a lunch at the Egyptian mission with a small group of reporters. But he said Egypt shouldn’t be expected to be America’s “fifty-first state… Our differences are part of the strength of our relationship.”
The close diplomatic relationship between Washington and Cairo has long contrasted with the two capitals highly contentious interaction at the U.N., where Egypt has clashed with American diplomats on a range of issues, including human rights and the nuclear threat posed by nuclear programs in Iran and Israel. “They see only Iran and we see Iran and Israel,” Abdelaziz said.
Previously unpublished U.S. diplomatic cables, obtained through WikiLeaks, highlight the intensely strained nature of Washington’s relations with Mubarak’s diplomatic corps.
U.S. diplomats bristled when they learned that Ban Ki Moon had decided to hire Mubarak’s pick, Mohamed Shaaban, to serve as a top member of the U.N. chief cabinet, and the top Egyptian in the U.N. system. They said he had actively foiled a U.S.-backed Broader Middle East and North Africa[BMENA] initiative to promote democracy and economic reform in the region.
In a 2007 U.S. cable from the U.S. embassy in Cairo, an American diplomat reported that the United States had “generally found Ambassador Shaaban unhelpful and dogmatic, with a mandate to stymie U.S., European and G-8 efforts in the Broader Middle East and North Africa context. …Shaaban’s performance at BMENA conferences is characterized by his negativity, his opposition to meaningful NGO participation, and by his lawyerly effort to gut the BMENA.”
Shaabaan told Turtle Bay by email “that I was not Mubarak’s pick…My selection by the Secretary-General was on merit; the Foreign Minister of Egypt presented the two [Egyptian] names and it was the Secretary-General, after interviewing some 7 senior officials from the Middle East, who selected me.”
Shaaban challenged the U.S. characterization of his diplomatic role in opposing the U.S. backed regional initiative, saying that he was largely acting on instructions from Cairo. “No senior official in Egypt at that time could decide how to negotiate; even the Foreign Minister had to receive directives from the President,” Shaaban wrote. ” So, I did not stymie U.S., European and G-8s effort in the Broader Middle East and North Africa context. I acted upon direct instructions from the Foreign Minister of Egypt.”
Shaaban said charges that he personally opposed NGO participation in the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative and tried to gut its pro-democracy aims are also “unsubstantiated since I was acting on clear and unambiguous instructions from the Foreign Minister of Egypt.”
The American view of Egypt’s former envoy to the U.N. in Geneva, Sameh Shoukry, was even more negative. In a July, 2008, cable entitled “Egypt’s Ambassador Shoukry and his aggressive delegation in Geneva,” the U.S. mission there cited Egypt’s obstructionist policies:
Led by Ambasasdor Sameh Shoukry, Egypts delegation in Geneva has stood out for its activist and at times aggressive approach to Geneva multilateral diplomacy, in pursuit of goals the United States does not support.
This has been most noticeable in the Human Rights Council, where Egypt has been arguably the most difficult delegation from the U.S. perspective, pushing hard — and often effectively — for many troubling Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) resolutions and amendments, such as one that subverted the mandate on freedom of expression.”
Abdelaziz admitted that American diplomats have also expressed irritation about his own work at the U.N.
The reason that Egypt remains largely sanguine about these criticisms is that its ability to wield influence on the international stage often depends less on its relationship with the United States than on its ability to leverage the U.N.’s large voting blocs, including the OIC (57 states), the Arab League, the Group of 77 (130 states) and the Non-aligned Movement (118 states).
Abdelaziz says that Egypt’s membership in these groups helps it gain broad support for its initiatives on Palestinian, and Egypt’s other regional priorities at the U.N. But it also imposes on Egypt “conditions and positions that are not necessarily in agreement with the positions that are taken by the United States,” he said.
Abdelaziz said that Egypt’s tougher approach to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has strengthened its standing at the United Nations. “This new approach is putting us more on the map of the international scene and the regional scene,” he said. He noted that Obama’s commitment to provide additional funding reflected the “will and wish on the part of the United States to maintain and support such an Egyptian role.”
Follow me on Twitter @columlynch
Colum Lynch was a staff writer at Foreign Policy between 2010 and 2022. Twitter: @columlynch
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