The military gains an edge

By Hani Sabra

Egypt’s future political framework is now being shaped by a developing rift between secular and Islamist activists. In the days leading up to former President Hosni Mubarak’s departure, the activists and the military emerged as the two powers in the country. The military has since gained an advantage by exploiting splits within the activists and by partnering with the Islamists. The military still needs the weakened secular activists, however, in order to maintain its legitimacy. And despite the poor relations between the three groups, a delicate, mutually-beneficial accord that stabilizes Egypt after elections remains likely.

Egypt’s secular democracy activists are becoming increasingly critical of the ruling military council. The activists’ two basic criticisms of the military are that it is instituting "Mubarakism" without Mubarak, and that the military has cut a power-sharing deal with the Islamists. For their part, the Islamist political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood are now conspicuously pro-military.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a convenient short-term partner for the military because it is less revolutionary, less idealistic, and more organized than the secular activists. The military gets a partner that it can monitor, and one that can mobilize supporters. The Islamists get to play the more prominent role that eluded them under Mubarak, while leaving the real power to the military. Wary of appearing too assertive, the Brotherhood, for example, has promised not to field a presidential candidate. Abdel Moneim Aboulfotouh, the Brotherhood member who has expressed interest in running, is a moderate, with democratic sensibilities, and a maverick within the organization who has fallen out of favor with the Brotherhood’s leadership, which has said that it is not supporting his candidacy.

But the military ultimately prefers some sort of balance between Islamists and other political forces. The military prizes stability and has long been dependent on U.S. financial support. It wants to ensure that the Islamists, who are perceived as dangerous in the United States and Europe, have only a share of power. The military in fact needs secular forces to have some presence in a future government despite its lack of comfort with them. The secular activists still have a strong degree of popularity, particularly in the major cities, and the military needs them to have a stake in the system in order to ensure stable governance.

There is, of course, a chance that the military holds on to power, but the scenario remains unlikely. Crime remains a problem in Egypt, and the military, which has been slow to respond to unsettling sectarian attacks, could make the argument that holding elections in an unstable security environment is too dangerous. The military could also point to the worsening economic situation. Diesel supplies are dwindling and food prices are rising. But if the military were to keep power for itself, it would face significant domestic and international pressure and face likely isolation and fiscal punishment. But if Prime Minister Essam Sharaf or a number of prominent ministers in the transitional government resign, it would be an indication that the military is planning to more overtly wield the reins.

Hani Sabra is an analyst with Eurasia Group’s Middle East practice.