Seeing the real enemy in Pakistan

Just days after U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen confirmed that the Pakistani military had agreed to launch a major offensive in North Waziristan, Pakistani government and army officials have equivocated about the timing and breadth of the operation, or even if it would be undertaken in the first place. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s most recent remarks suggest that the government would make its own determination and would not allow anyone to force it into any decisions about an eventual operation. Although military commanders had previously described the possible undertaking as being "selective" and "intelligence led," Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and the Corps Commander in charge of operations in Khyber-Puktunkhwa and adjacent tribal regions, Lt. General Asif Yasin Malik, have both asserted that there were no immediate plans to launch an offensive.

But even if an operation were to be launched in North Waziristan, it could prove counterproductive, even dangerous, if steered by the current Pakistani military and political strategy of separating militants into "good" and "bad" camps. Choosing which militants to go after and which to spare compromises the military’s ability to identify the threat holistically, and address it adequately. It has been reported that during President Hamid Karzai’s recent visit, Pakistan agreed to target militants within its borders that launch attacks on Afghanistan and refuse to take part in the peace talks being sought by the U.S. and Afghanistan. Although warmly welcomed by Afghani officials, this agreement will only validate Islamabad’s efforts to delay targeting militant groups like the Haqqani Network as it attempts to persuade stakeholders that the Haqqanis can-or should-be  brought to the negotiating table. President Karzai and his Pakistani counterpart both evaded direct questions on the Haqqani Network during their appearance for the press to discuss their meeting.

Before the May 2 raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden, there were reports that the Pakistani military had undertaken its own peace talks with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Gen. Kayani had attempted to protect in the wake of a particularly deadly U.S. drone strike. The TTP, however, did not reciprocate the sentiment after the death of al-Qaeda’s leader. On May 22, they launched a 16-hour assault of the Mehran naval airbase in Karachi, killing 13 military personnel and destroying two P-3C Orion aircraft. The TTP has also bombed a paramilitary training center and a police post, and helped engineer a series of massive raids in the Upper Dir region involving 400 allied militants who crossed over from Afghanistan. This backlash only affirms that militant groups on either side of the border cannot be wholly separated from each other, and treated differently by Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment.

On the other side of the coin, Pakistani lashkars seem absent from any substantive military thought. Lashkars are groups of armed tribal volunteers that the government mobilized in the northwest to provide operational support in military action and who received material backing from security forces. Prior to reportedly initiating talks with the Taliban, the army withdrew its financial and logistical support from lashkars, leaving them feeling betrayed and angry at the prospect that government forces would consider trusting the Taliban, and exposing them to militant attack. But now, with pressure mounting to launch an offensive in North Waziristan, the army has indicated it may raise similar tribal militias in that area to eliminate al-Qaeda and foreign militants. This exemplifies the army’s proclivity to base consequential military decisions on political considerations. Utilizing lashkars allows the army to continue cooperating with the U.S. while appearing "sovereign" to its domestic audience. But the military does not have a plan to peacefully demobilize these lashkars once they have been organized, a grave oversight that could turn them into the next militant problem in the region if their perceived security and material needs are not met.

Though the Pakistani military has taken considerable measures against militants, state insecurity has grown persistently worse over the past few years. In light of this failing, it is stunning that there is no outrage within the military itself, which has suffered incredibly at the hands of militants, to push for a strategic re-think. One reason for this silence is that the army holds the greatest influence in military and intelligence strategy in Pakistan, and is the only armed service involved in national politics. This means that decisions by the army and the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) do not derive purely from military wisdom or lessons from the battlefield. Both organizations are instead locked in patterns of self-defeating behavior, existing as both frontline targets for militants and regional strategic thinkers who believe some militants could be future allies. The attack on the naval base in Karachi could raise the level of naval participation in charting a future anti-militant course, but it is unlikely any help the navy provides will be of strategic consequence. Ultimately, it must be the army that questions its own priorities.

Beyond a strategic re-think, it is equally imperative for the armed forces to readjust at a tactical level. As the cross-border attack in Dir demonstrates, even within the northwest, where the military is active, other law enforcement agencies such as the police remain woefully under-equipped compared to their Taliban attackers. And in other parts of the country that have been consistently targeted, there seems to be little, if any planning for defending the civilian population or military establishments from assault.  An operation in North Waziristan would likely require military and law enforcement agencies to position themselves to effectively handle the blowback that will almost certainly extend beyond North Waziristan or even Kurram, if an operation takes place there, as has been suggested by senior military figures.

Yet in the face of increasing chaos, the absence of an internal debate within the military indicates that it is unlikely to engage in self-evaluation. The only other way to force a reassessment would be through a push by the civilian government. Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif, for instance, has loudly questioned the current security doctrine, and has asked for military accountability. But Sharif lacks the credibility and the influence to make headway in triggering a meaningful review, much less changing the military’s threat perception. Gen. Kayani recently released an uncommonly detailed statement after meeting with his top commanders that condemned U.S. drone strikes and emphasized that the army had terminated its training relationship with the U.S. and scaled down intelligence sharing. The most important part of this statement however, was the call to divert U.S. military aid "to bolster the economy and help ordinary citizens," a demand which is neither based on military reasoning nor a decision the military has the authority to enforce. The content of the statement was crafted specifically to counter domestic political pressure against the army and appease public opinion, something the military will likely succeed in accomplishing. 

The factors most likely to sway the decisions of the military, for better or for worse, may ultimately lie in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, particularly as the U.S. begins to draw down in Afghanistan. In the short term, if the U.S. were to collaborate with Pakistan on seeking targets viewed as enemies by Islamabad, they could try to trade this cooperation for more aggressive steps by the Pakistani military to take on militant strongholds. Stepping up civilian protection and purging urban areas of militants could allow the military to redeem itself with its domestic audience in the wake of the attack on the Mehran base, Saleem Shahzad’s suspicious murder, and the execution of an unarmed civilian by the paramilitary Rangers in Karachi, particularly because such an action would not be viewed through the distortive lens of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Within that framework, the possible death of Ilyas Kashmiri in a U.S. drone strike and plans for joint intelligence teams between the two countries bode well. However, it would be optimistic to expect bold cooperation from Pakistan on targets that the military has been reluctant to go after in the past, even if there are indications of an agreement to target other militants.

In the longer term, the progress of U.S. peace talks with the Afghan Taliban will be important to help gauge Pakistan’s future behavior. If the talks proceed, it will be an incentive for Pakistan’s military to reopen its own dialogue with the TTP. The second key area will be whether Pakistan will be able to persuade the U.S. that the Haqqani Network can be brought to the negotiating table. If that bet does not pay off, it will invalidate the steep investment Pakistan’s military has made for favorable outcomes in Afghanistan. But perhaps more importantly, having an active Haqqani Network still based in Pakistan after the U.S. draw down will make it even more difficult to dismantle the greater militant syndicate in Pakistan, and will decrease the chances for success of an already hazardous attempt to talk peace with the TTP. 

Pakistanis have so far been forgiving of their military, acknowledging the sacrifices of their brave servicemen in a decade-long struggle. But military officers sworn at commission to refrain from engaging in political activity and to defend the country from aggression have, by their own standards, lost sight of their mission and failed the people. Not being able to recognize that failing is at the root of the military’s myopia, and has prevented it from gaining traction against the violent extremism that is endangering Pakistan’s national goals.

Merium Khan is an analyst for Pakistan at Georgetown University’s Imaging Science and Information Systems (ISIS) Center.