Was Libya worth it?
With the Libyan rebels now largely in control of Tripoli, and two of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s sons in custody after a stunning final assault of the capital, the answer seems clear: absolutely. Many have criticized U.S. President Barack Obama’s strategy of "leading from behind" in Libya, but that strategy now seems utterly vindicated. It was Libyans ...
With the Libyan rebels now largely in control of Tripoli, and two of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s sons in custody after a stunning final assault of the capital, the answer seems clear: absolutely.
Many have criticized U.S. President Barack Obama’s strategy of "leading from behind" in Libya, but that strategy now seems utterly vindicated. It was Libyans themselves, with significant help from NATO, Qatar, and the UAE, who liberated their country from Qaddafi’s grip — a fact about which they are fiercely and justly proud. It required little from American taxpayers: As of Thursday, NATO operations had cost the United States around $1.1 billion, according to CFR’s Micah Zenko — a rounding error.
Of course, there will be problems. Not only is Tripoli not yet fully secure, but two regime strongholds — Sirte and Sabha — appear to remain in regime hands. Libyan state TV is still, incredibly, on the air. The "brother leader" remains at large, as do his sons Muatassim and Khamis Qaddafi, as well as his intelligence chief and brother-in-law Abdullah al-Senussi. They may try, Saddam-style, to mount an insurgency (though the speed of Qaddafi’s collapse in Tripoli suggest they will find few takers).
The National Transitional Council won’t have an easy time of governing, either. Not only is it not clear how much loyalty it commands among the fighters, but Libya has effectively no institutions: It was a state run for the benefit of the Qaddafi family and its shrinking circle of friends and allies. There is little history of political pluralism in Libya, and no doubt many grievances and cleavages lurk below the surface. (Reuters journalist Michael Georgy raises some important concerns to this effect here.) There will likely be intense disagreements over how to distribute Libya’s oil wealth, how to account for the last 42 years of despotic rule, how to incorporate Islam into the state, and how to disarm and integrate the disparate fighting brigades that overthrew Qaddafi. There will be a temptation to overly centralize power, fueled by oil receipts concentrated in a few hands. Hopefully, any conflicts that arise will be resolved peacefully.
But these problems seem manageable over time, and it is in any case hard to imagine any Libyan government worse than Qaddafi, whose rule was not only deeply repressive and arbitrary at home but also destabilizing abroad. I disagree strongly with those, like CFR’s Richard Haass, who would like to see some kind of foreign stabilization force — not only is it not going to happen, but it’s best if Libyans handle their own affairs as much as possible. They will make mistakes, but these will be their own mistakes. It’s now their country once again.
And that’s the best news about the fall of Qaddafi. It is the only case so far in which Arab revolutionaries themselves will get the chance to overhaul the old order. In Tunisia and Egypt, the old regimes are still very much in power — at least until new elections are held and new constitutions are written. And even then, gaining full civilian control over the military and the security apparatus will be a years-long struggle. Libya has the chance to wipe the slate clean, and given what a terrible system is being overthrown, that alone seems like reason enough to celebrate.