Did Putin really think his decision through?

Professional autocrats have practical reasons for playing their cards close to the chest: Neither friends nor enemies can confidently strategize against you; your vital aura of mystery remains in place; and you demonstrate who is truly in charge. So it is with Vladimir Putin, who seems to have confided to just one intimate his intention of reclaiming the mantle of Russian president. Friends and respected others say this is no surprise. Yet I am baffled — there is almost no upside for Putin in sitting in the Kremlin, and much disadvantageous in doing so.

Let’s start with some housekeeping. Over the weekend, I too hastily announced two winners of the Kremlin Contest, the betting competition on who would serve as Russia’s president for the next six years. The winners — Michael Perice of New Jersey and Theo Francis of Washington, D.C. — submitted identical entries: They both guessed that Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev would swap places, with Putin announcing the decision Dec. 8, which was the closest date. But since then, Russia’s finance minister extraordinaire — Alexei Kudrin (pictured above, exchanging mutual glares with Putin) — has openly rebelled and declined to serve a Medvedev-led government. Kudrin has so much domestic and international economic cachet — he had himself been seen as a potential prime minister — that observers think his brinkmanship can’t be ignored. Putin may have to seriously consider running with him, not Medvedev. Since we have contestants who bet on a Putin-Kudrin ticket, we’ve withdrawn the declaration of the winners and will stand by while the dogs fight under the carpet.

The Kudrin surprise is important whatever the case — Putin appears to have tipped his decision only to Medvedev, who had to know because he was the one who made the announcement at a United Russia party convention Saturday. That it openly did not go over well is telling.

A few years ago, such secretiveness would have been no problem. But Russia is a different place from 2008, when Putin elevated Medvedev and became prime minister. Now, Kudrin — appearing to have been blindsided and possessing the chops to confidently complain — has forced Putin into a possibly awkward position of not appearing as all-powerful as he likes.

That is one interesting juxtaposition for studying this puzzling announcement. Another is the spectacle of Putin’s decision set against some of this year’s main news, and I don’t mean Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. I mean news from the establishment autocracies of Singapore and Saudi Arabia, both places whose strongman-style of governance is more or less accepted by the world’s leading countries.

In May, Singapore Minister-Mentor Lee Kuan Yew — the example for every autocrat in Asia — officially retired, and by appearances genuinely meant it. Meanwhile yesterday, Saudi King Abdullah announced that women would have the right to vote starting in 2015.

Granted these do not equate to breakouts of democracy, but they are significant moves in two of the most stable and wealthy autocratic states on the planet. Put that twin news up against Putin’s flagrant trifling with the Russian public.

This blog has always regarded Medvedev as an extension of Putin, so a continued Medvedev presidency would not have been a sign of liberalism. Yet there is a difference — Putin has demonstrated a hostility toward some of the West’s proudest moments, such as its backing of the Libyan uprising (he assailed it as a "medieval call for a crusade"); Medvedev can and did support the uprising because he isn’t handicapped by an obsession with machismo. Without a Medvedev figure in front of him, Putin may be unlikely himself to make similar gestures.

The mysterious part is deciphering Putin’s advantage in shifting back to the Kremlin. Putin ultimately is a coldly calculating politician. There is little sentimentality — his extravagant loyalty to former mentors is the exception in this category — and important moves are weighed for risk. Leaving Medvedev in the Kremlin, Putin could take responsibility for Russia’s successes, with all knowing he is in charge, while blaming Medvedev for what goes wrong. But if Putin himself shifted back to the Kremlin, he loses this foil. His political risk grows. In short, the calculation favors the current tandem.

Yet, again given Putin’s cold personality, one must take seriously the decision he actually made. It’s possible that he fears a potential slip of power. The circle around Medvedev had naively (to say the least) supposed that their man could prevail in an open political contest with Putin and encouraged Medvedev to make a fight of it. I personally had thought that Medvedev was sufficiently shrewd to tell them to get lost and assure Putin of his fealty should he be permitted to stay on as president. If Putin had been successfully comforted, there might have been a very different announcement Saturday.