Interview: China’s Security Council diplomacy

For the Western countries on the UN Security Council, the question of where China stands is a constant preoccupation. The country’s veto power means that nothing can happen without its acquiescence; its growing economic and political clout mean that active Chinese support is often essential for Council action to be meaningful. I corresponded recently with Joel Wuthnow, a research associate with Princeton University’s China and the World Program about Beijing’s evolving approach to Security Council diplomacy:

Bosco: The recent Chinese and Russian veto of a draft resolution on Syria has generated anger from Western governments and from the human rights community. It seems to confirm the perception that China is wedded to a vision of national sovereignty very much at odds with that of the West and that may prevent the Security Council from effectively addressing bloody internal conflicts. How do you see the veto in the context of China’s broader performance on the Council?  

Wuthnow: I don’t think China’s veto says much about the importance of sovereignty in Beijing’s decision-making at the UN. I also doubt that China’s approval of sanctions against Libya — and its acquiescence to the use of force — earlier this year is evidence of a shift in favor of interventionism. Both cases follow a similar logic, which is political, not normative. On Libya, China followed broad regional opinion in favor of coercion. On Syria, it followed the backlash against intense intervention in the Middle East that occurred after the NATO campaign against Qaddafi. In neither case did it take the lead. Rather, it gauged the political winds and acted accordingly.  

Bosco: You’ve identified what seems to be a key factor in China’s UN diplomacy–a deep reluctance to appear isolated. China has, for example, abstained quite frequently on Council resolutions. Do you believe that this reticence is beginning to yield to a more assertive stance? And should we expect China to begin using the Security Council affirmatively at any point?

Wuthnow: China is much more engaged today than it used to be. For instance, back in the 1970s, Beijing abstained on votes on peacekeeping, which it regarded as a tool of U.S. imperialism. Now China contributes nearly 2000 troops to peacekeeping operations around the world, and has rightly taken credit for doing so. On the other hand, China hesitates to take a leading role on sensitive topics like Iran, Burma, or Libya. The mainstream thinking in Beijing is that China should avoid the costs of global leadership while focusing on economic development and national consolidation. Those who favor a more affirmative, multilateralist diplomacy appear to be a distinct minority within the PRC.

Bosco: Is it fair to say that over the past several decades Security Council membership has helped to acculturate China to being a world power?

Wuthnow: In a sense, yes. China values the prestige and authority that comes with permanent membership in the Security Council. After all, this is a privilege not accorded to other powers, like India or Japan. So China is very status-quo-oriented in terms of wanting to keep the institution around and functioning effectively. At the same time, I don’t think its participation has made much difference in how China sees its responsibilities as a great power. It does sometimes act; and an example would be using influence to convince Omar al-Bashir to admit UN peacekeepers to Darfur in 2007. But this tends to come only as a result of prodding by the U.S. and others.

Bosco: How close would you say diplomatic coordination is with Russia and the BRICS countries more generally on UN matters? Is it fair to speak about BRICS as a diplomatic bloc?

Wuthnow: China and Russia have a mutually-supportive relationship in the Security Council. For instance, China has historically backed up Russia’s position on Iran, with Russia seconding China’s position on North Korea. The conventional wisdom has been, if you can get Russia’s vote, China will fold because it doesn’t want to cast a lone veto. But there are exceptions. In the 1990s, China — without Russia’s support — vetoed two proposals regarding assistance to states that had, in Beijing’s eyes, unacceptable relations with Taiwan.

BRICS is more problematic because of internal divisions. It’s hard to imagine India as a reliable ally of China, for example. And we saw that on the Syria draft, where India, Brazil and South Africa abstained rather than vote “no.” We also saw Brazil going its own way on the negotiations on Iran in 2010. So I’m skeptical about BRICS as a cohesive bloc, but their goals may align more than the U.S. would like.

Bosco: In the wake of allegations about an assassination plot in Washington, the United States is ramping up diplomatic pressure on Iran and may seek Council action. Any sense of how China might align itself?

Wuthnow: China may be receptive to some form of pressure on Iran. The reason is that China’s core interest in the Middle East is in stability, and this is jeopardized by state sponsorship of terrorism. China also has a major political stake in retaining positive ties with Saudi Arabia, which is its leading source of foreign oil. The problem is getting the PRC to agree to sanctions on Iran’s energy sector, and this is undermined by corporate actors in China that have major equities involved. If the U.S. case is persuasive, then I’d expect China would be willing to support some type of response, but certainly nothing crippling.