Heresy over defense, part 2

One of the things that I enjoy most about Shadow Government is the diversity of views that its members hold. I was particularly heartened that my friend and former colleague Kori Schake responded to my call for a debate over defense spending by firing a volley in defense of the new orthodoxy on defense spending. Specifically, she attempts to make the case that the federal debt is a national security threat that demands further defense cuts, that the United States has a large margin of superiority over potential adversaries, and we need to seek greater efficiency in defense.

I agree with Kori that our national debt is an important national security concern, but I also agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey that it is not our most important one. In my view, it would be strategically unsound, even if it were economically possible, to balance the budget on the back of defense.

I agree that defense should not be "out of bounds" in budget matters. But the fact is that in a period that has witnessed a massive expansion of government spending, the Defense Department has already sustained several rounds of cuts, dating back to the first months of the Obama administration. As both Robert Gates and Leon Panetta have argued, additional cuts cannot help but affect U.S. security.

Kori and I disagree as to the magnitude of America’s military advantage. Some parts of the world (Europe, for example) are clearly safer and more secure than in decades past. But other parts of the world, such as Asia, are less secure. Of particular concern is China’s ongoing military modernization, a portion of which is aimed at coercing U.S. allies and denying the United States access to the Western Pacific. As I have argued elsewhere, the United States has consistently underestimated the scope and pace of China’s fielding of new weapons, including those designed to counter U.S. power projection forces. Moreover, over the past decade the weapons most needed to respond to such developments have received short shrift in the Pentagon budget. As a result, the United States faces an increasingly unfavorable military balance in the Western Pacific.

Kori argues that the U.S. armed forces have undergone a "rolling modernization." In fact, however, the post-9/11 military buildup has produced few new weapon systems, and those that have been fielded over the past decade have been geared toward a particular kind of war against a particular kind of foe. For example, the United States fielded thousands of Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles for Iraq and a sent a second generation to Afghanistan. Such vehicles are unlikely to be of much use in future wars, however. And the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that have been crucial to U.S. success in combating insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and targeting terrorists in Pakistan are unlikely to survive in a conflict with an adversary that possesses even a rudimentary air defense network.

Whole parts of the U.S. armed forces have been left out of whatever "rolling modernization" has taken place. U.S. Air Force aircraft are on average more than 23 years old, the oldest in Air Force history, and are getting older. Many transport aircraft and aerial refueling tankers are more than 40 years old, and some may be as old as 70-80 years before they retire. The U.S. Navy is smaller now than it was before the United States entered World War I, and is getting smaller. No "rolling modernization" will reverse these trends; only full-scale recapitalization of the U.S. armed forces will.

As a veteran of the war in Iraq and as someone who has dedicated a good portion of my professional career to educating officers, I am immensely proud of the men and women of the U.S. armed forces. Kori and I agree that they are "amazingly proficient and adaptive." But the U.S. armed forces have devoted the past decade to perfecting a particular type of warfare – counterinsurgency. Tomorrow’s wars are likely to look much different than today’s, and in focusing on winning today’s wars we have all too often neglected preparing for tomorrow’s.

Finally, Kori and I agree that efficiency is desirable. I applauded Secretary of Gates’ efforts to seek efficiencies in the defense budget, and certainly feel that more can be done. However, the ultima ratio of defense is effectiveness, not efficiency. That is, defense spending ultimately exists to provide security to the American people. Inefficient yet effective defense remains preferable to efficient yet ineffective defense.