Rumelt on strategy (V): Where he falters, and where he reminds me of Clausewitz in his discussions of ‘the hard discipline’
As you might have guessed, I really liked reading Richard Rumelt’s book on strategy. But I have to say that I found his military examples less persuasive than his anecdotes drawn from the world of business. For example, he slams as an waste of print the statement that the mission of the Defense Department is ...
As you might have guessed, I really liked reading Richard Rumelt's book on strategy. But I have to say that I found his military examples less persuasive than his anecdotes drawn from the world of business. For example, he slams as an waste of print the statement that the mission of the Defense Department is to "deter conflict-but should deterrence fail, to fight and win the nation's wars." I actually think that elevating deterrence to a mission equal to fighting wars is hugely significant, with far-reaching consequences for force structure and spending, especially on readiness and R&D.
As you might have guessed, I really liked reading Richard Rumelt’s book on strategy. But I have to say that I found his military examples less persuasive than his anecdotes drawn from the world of business. For example, he slams as an waste of print the statement that the mission of the Defense Department is to “deter conflict-but should deterrence fail, to fight and win the nation’s wars.” I actually think that elevating deterrence to a mission equal to fighting wars is hugely significant, with far-reaching consequences for force structure and spending, especially on readiness and R&D.
On the other hand, Rumelt is positively Clausewitzian when he advises that, “A great deal of strategy work is trying to figure out what is going on. Not just deciding what to do, but the more fundamental problem of comprehending the situation.” That’s an Americanized version of Clausewitz’s admonition that the foremost task of the commander is to recognize the nature of the conflict in which he is engaged, and not to try to make it something else.
Also, Rumelt reminds me a bit of those decisions Marshall (and, to a lesser degree) Eisenhower had to make in World War II when he writes that, “strategy is primarily about deciding what is truly important and focusing resources and action on that objective. It is a hard discipline because focusing on one thing always slights another.”
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