Van Creveld’s deceptively simple for formula for measuring military power –and Peter Mansoor’s rip on van Creveld
For some reason, in my research for my book on American generalship, I read a lot about military effectiveness over the summer — parts of the classic Millett and Murray series and of John Ellis’ Brute Force, plus the conclusion of Martin van Creveld‘s Fighting Power. I finally realized that the issue was not really ...
For some reason, in my research for my book on American generalship, I read a lot about military effectiveness over the summer -- parts of the classic Millett and Murray series and of John Ellis' Brute Force, plus the conclusion of Martin van Creveld's Fighting Power. I finally realized that the issue was not really central to my book, but the books still were worth reading.
For some reason, in my research for my book on American generalship, I read a lot about military effectiveness over the summer — parts of the classic Millett and Murray series and of John Ellis’ Brute Force, plus the conclusion of Martin van Creveld‘s Fighting Power. I finally realized that the issue was not really central to my book, but the books still were worth reading.
Here is van Creveld’s deceptively simple formula: “the military worth of an army equals the quantity and quality of its equipment multiplied by its fighting power.” (P. 174) (Paul Gorman had something similar in his on-line papers.) The question, of course, is how does one create and assess this fighting power? — and that issue is what his book explores.
That said, check out this crack by Professor Doctor Colonel Peter Mansoor on page 255 of The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945:
Few American commanders of the World War II era would agree with authors such as Martin van Creveld that the Germany army was more effective. While the cream of the Wehrmacht, the panzer and panzer grenadier divisions, were more combat-effective organizations and a match for the divisions of the Army of the United States, the bulk of the German army was not composed of these units. The average German infantry division could not defeat an American infantry division in battle, while American infantry divisions consistently proved their ability to accomplish their missions against the enemy divisions in their front.
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