What we learned from the IAEA Report on Iran

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) circulated its latest report on Iran’s nuclear program to member states yesterday, in preparation for an upcoming meeting in Vienna. We learned several important things from the leaked report and the immediate reactions to it.

If the information cited by the IAEA is correct (and the IAEA rarely errs by commission), two points are inescapable:

1. "Iran has carried out activities relevant to development of a nuclear explosive device."

Prior to the end of 2003, Iran pursued a "structured program" of these activities and there are indications that some of them "continued after 2003" and "may still be ongoing."

The report details specific examples including, procurement of equipment and materials by individuals and organizations associated with Iran’s military, efforts to develop undeclared means to produce nuclear material, acquisition of weapons development information from a clandestine network, and work on an indigenous nuclear weapon design, "including testing of components." The reported detail extends to fast-acting detonator development useful for fabricating an implosion device, efforts at hydrodynamic tests to evaluate weapons designs without fissile material, and work to manufacture neutron initiators.

2. The report discredits Iran’s protestations that its nuclear activities are entirely peaceful.

The IAEA released the additional details on Iran’s program, which had long been known to the Agency, out of frustration that Iran has been stonewalling. Repeated requests for more information, clarification, or explanation have been ignored by Tehran for years. Now Iran is confronted publicly with details that it can neither persuasively explain away nor ignore.

At least provisionally, we learned two additional points from the reaction to the IAEA report:

1. Russia is intent on shielding Iran from any additional pressure to halt its nuclear weapons-related activities

The immediate Russian reaction was not to criticize Iran, but rather to scuttle the notion of additional sanctions. According to the New York Times, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennadi Gatilov said "This approach is unacceptable to us, and the Russian side does not intend to consider such a proposal." Russia can enforce its position by wielding its United Nations Security Council veto. Absent action by the Council, Russia, China, and others will be free to relieve Iran from whatever additional pressures the United States and the European Union might attempt to apply.

2. Iran is intent on its current course, and shows little interest in a negotiated solution.

Iran’s reaction to the report, offered by its president and its representative to the IAEA, was to criticize furiously the Agency and its director. The former reportedly said, "The Iranian nation does not fear you if it wants to make a bomb, but it does not need a bomb."

Dismal is the product of these lessons. Iran is proceeding along the path to a nuclear weapons capability. Russia will block any attempts to pressure Iran to desist. Tehran evinces little interest in negotiation. As others have observed before, Iran is a land of bad and worse options, and even those options are dwindling with the passage of time and the spinning of centrifuges.