In defense of the veto power

The members of the UN Security Council are girding themselves for what will likely be a contentious debate on Syria. For all the empassioned rhetoric that will be deployed, there is one simple reality: if Russia doesn’t like what’s on the table, it will veto. And that noxious outcome will no doubt revive the perennial debate over whether the veto power is worth having.

The most straightforward response is that the debate is entirely academic. The veto’s not going anywhere. Amending the UN Charter requires the assent of the veto-wielding permanent five and none of them would contemplate shedding their privileges (least of all the United States). Absent a new world constitutional moment–which would not benefit the West or the cause of human rights at all–the veto is here to stay.

That said, there are a few things worth noting about the veto power and its use. First, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Russia and China are not the most profligate in their use of the veto. Since the 1970s, that distinction has belonged to the United States (usually on draft resolutions containing criticism of Israel). Second, overall use of the veto has declined markedly since the end of the Cold War. The threat of the veto has important shadow effects on Council deliberations, of course, but the historical trajectory is toward greater consensus on the Council and against the casual use of the veto.

Perhaps the most fundamental point about the veto is that you could not have a Security Council without it. Major powers will simply not grant an international body binding legal authority on matters of peace and security unless they are certain that it will not prejudice their interests. So the alternative to the Security Council veto is really no Security Council, or at least not in a recognizable form. As maddening as the likely Russian nyet will be, that’s a tradeoff that few would be willing to make. As frustrating as it is, the Security Council is still an enormously useful body, not least because it institutionalizes the practice of great-power security consultations.

If jettisoning the veto power is both impractical and ill-advised, there is an alternative for those convinced that the world must put an end to the Syria violence, through forceful means if necessary: pretending that the veto power doesn’t exist. There’s ample precedent for that route just in the last couple decades, from Kosovo to Iraq. Brilliant and inventive international lawyers have periodically tried to argue that the "responsibility to protect" has somehow–through the mysterious workings of customary international law–rendered the veto power inapplicable in cases of mass atrocities. Whether taking that route is advisable in the case of Syria really depends less on the legal viability of that argument and more on the likely political effects. How would Russia react? How might reinforcing that precedent come back to bite those employing it? Is there a feasible intervention plan? Is anyone actually willing to commit forces?

My guess is that the answers to those questions will militate against international intervention. And that points to another benefit of the veto power: it can be quite convenient in maintaining the fiction that someone else is keeping you from doing something you have no intention of doing in the first place.