Will the Saudis follow through and intervene in favor of Iraq’s Sunnis?

By John H. Haas

Best Defense department of sectarian affairs

When we think about how the Iraq war upset whatever once passed for equilibrium in that part of the Middle East, most of us think in terms of the boost it gave to Iran by removing a historic enemy. But there were and are other players intimately concerned about the consequences of the changes we initiated in Iraq, as I was reminded of last week as I did a little Googling into some of the nooks and crannies of the last decade.  This, for instance, got my attention:

“But if a phased [U.S.] troop withdrawal does begin, the violence will escalate dramatically.  In this case, remaining on the sidelines would be unacceptable to Saudi Arabia. To turn a blind eye to the massacre of Iraqi Sunnis would be to abandon the principles upon which the kingdom was founded. It would undermine Saudi Arabia’s credibility in the Sunni world and would be a capitulation to Iran’s militarist actions in the region.  To be sure, Saudi engagement in Iraq carries great risks — it could spark a regional war. So be it: The consequences of inaction are far worse.”  

Those ominous words were written by Nawaf Obaid, national security adviser to King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, late in 2006.  This was, you will recall, when popular discontent with the war was cresting at the mid-term elections and the Iraq study group was expected soon to recommend a U.S. draw-down; it was also shortly before President Bush announced the surge.

We all know what happened. U.S. troops heroically redoubled their efforts to provide security in Iraq, the horrific violence of 2006-2007 eventually subsided, and Iraqis were given the space to arrive at some kind of political reconciliation which would, it was hoped, allow the nation to proceed without tumbling into the apocalypse we’d witnessed — and they’d suffered — over the past several years. That broader political aim was not fully achieved.

What if the period 2007-2010 wasn’t a transition for Iraq, but a pause? What if the dynamics that gave us a sectarian civil war are still very much present, and Iraq spirals once again toward apocalypse?

The Saudis aren’t any less concerned about the Sunni population of Iraq now than they were in 2006, and Saudi-Iraqi relations are simply dismal. If Sunnis appear to be the targets of sectarian cleansing once again, will the Saudis be any less willing to risk a regional war?  And then?

Iran needs your prayers, it’s true, but save a few for the Saudis too.

John H. Haas teaches history at Bethel College in Indiana. Or maybe Cleveland.