The futility of predicting Iran’s future

When safety regulation makes automobiles safer, drivers (though obviously not all of them) are tempted to drive more recklessly, creating partially or completely offsetting effects on the overall level of safety. Economists have entertained this idea since it was first introduced by Sam Peltzman in the 1970s, some have rejected it while others, some of whom relied on data from NASCAR races, validated it. The "Peltzman effect" was also tested during the Cold War and more broadly in the realm of strategic affairs. Specifically, scholars have sought to understand the effect of the added perceived security a state acquires from nuclear weapons on its behavior in world politics.

Let us assume for a moment that Iran acquires a nuclear weapons capability (which is anything but inevitable given the many technical and political unknowns), a "nuclear seat belt or air bag" so to speak, will it behave like a more reckless driver? It is no surprise that analysts have had disagreements on this issue, some strong, others more nuanced. Most analysts however believe that a nuclear Iran — whether overtly nuclear-armed or capable of producing weapons quickly — would present an even greater challenge to Western interests and regional security than it does today, more aggressively protecting its strategic interests, projecting its power, pursuing its ideological ambitions, and meddling in the politics and security of its neighbors. A nuclear Iran could look more like Pakistan, a country that, after its 1998 nuclear tests, was feeling more confident on the regional and international stage and was arguably taking more risks in its policies toward its historical rival, India.

A more optimistic view of how a nuclear Iran would look and conduct itself in world politics suggests that mere possession of the bomb does not necessarily lead to a foreign policy of aggression and bellicosity. Despite its idiosyncratic features, ideological motivations and political instability, a nuclear Iran could resemble China, a country that, in pursuit of its security and diplomatic interests, has mostly sought to deter rather than confront, cooperate rather than defy, and coexist rather than threaten (except on the issues of Taiwan’s and Tibet’s independence, which continue to be red lines for the Chinese leadership).

Some have also questioned the usefulness of nuclear weapons for Iran, arguing that the strategic value of this "narrow category of weapons" lies primarily in regime security and deterrence of military threats, not subversion and blackmail. According to this reasoning, nuclear weapons are likely to work against goals of regional hegemony because of unintended effects such as an escalation of the Middle East arms race and a powerful U.S. response. One analyst went as far as to say that nuclear gambits simply do not work. While Iran may have a freer hand in regional politics and be able to expand its influence in the Middle East, a nuclear weapons capability is more likely to tame it, given its interest in avoiding escalation with other nuclear power states such as the United States and Israel. In sum, those less worried about the global security repercussions of a nuclear Iran maintain that the threat is "overblown."

Analysts have tried to predict the behavior of a nuclear Iran and have tailored their policy recommendations for the United States accordingly. They have relied on two approaches. The first, which borrows heavily from the logic of theories of nuclear proliferation and studies investigating the effects of nuclear weapons on a state’s foreign policy, makes inferences about the behavior of a nuclear Iran after looking at patterns of behavior by other nuclear weapons states. For example, if China, Pakistan, India, North Korea, and other nuclear weapons states followed similar courses of action after they obtained the bomb, Iran is more likely to follow suit. However, there are two obvious problems with this first approach: first, these states to begin with, did not behave similarly after they got the bomb. For example, China behaved more responsibly than North Korea and India much more to reassure the world about its intentions and capabilities and to safeguard its nuclear arsenal than did Pakistan. Second, even if one can find similarities in these states’ post-nuclear behaviors, it does not mean that Iran will follow a prescribed model. In other words, Iran obviously can still decide to go in a completely different direction.

The second approach, which is Iran-specific and somewhat more promising than the first, looks at trends in past Iranian behavior in regional and international crises and militarized disputes and attempts to make inferences about future behavior. For example, if evidence is found suggesting that Iran refrained more often than not from escalating during past crises and showed restraint when confronted with overwhelming force, the assumption is that it is more likely to do the same in the future. Indeed, if Iran acted "rationally" and was deterred from crossing red lines in the past, then it is possible that deterrence against Iran, even if armed with nuclear weapons, will work in the future. Several examples of past Iranian experiences and policies show that Tehran can be a "rational" and pragmatic state when it wants to, including its secret purchase of weapons from the United States in the mid-1980s (part of the Iran-Contra affair), its political and military conduct during the 1980-88 war with Iraq, its behavior in the 1980s "Tankers War," its intelligence cooperation with the United States on al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan following 9/11, its strategy toward U.S. forces operating in post-Saddam Iraq, and its response to Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. These examples and others indicate that Iran is perfectly capable of calculating its every move, of exercising political pragmatism, of understanding the dictates of deterrence, and of keeping its ideological ambitions in check when the costs are too high.

However, the reliability of this second approach is also questionable. The specific constellation of political, security, psychological, and geographic factors surrounding a certain crisis in the past may not be the same in a future one. In other words, every crisis is unique, and the decision to retreat or escalate depends not just on the nature of the external security threat, but also on how it is perceived and by whom. For example, if the balance of political forces inside the Iranian political system may have tilted in favor of those seeking foreign policy restraint during crises in the past, things might change for the worse in the future, and the odds are that they will, given that the hardliners in Tehran are currently dominant and the less than flexible Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is solidifying its grip on national security policy.

Also, it matters greatly whether a nuclear Iran finds itself, by default or design, locked in a crisis with Israel and the United States, two nuclear weapons states, or with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, two non-nuclear weapons states. Iran will obviously feel more confident in disputes with states that do not have the bomb. But at the same time, this does not necessarily mean that Iran will be less assertive or extra prudent when facing states that are armed with nuclear weapons. The case of India and Pakistan illustrates how militarized disputes between nuclear weapons states can be less than stable. The military engagement of May-July 1999 between the two countries, the military stand-off of December 2001 to June 2002 after the terrorist operation on the Indian Parliament, and the most recent crisis following the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed over 160 people mirrored the conflict escalation pattern for nuclear-armed states. Specifically, the leaders of both sides initiated troop mobilizations, put their militaries on alert, and proceeded to evacuate civilians from border-area villages. Perhaps the presence of a contiguous border and the territorial dispute over Kashmir makes the India-Pakistan case more escalation-prone than that of Iran and Israel who do not share a border or have disputes over territory. Yet there are factors in the Iran-Israel relationship that also make it especially unstable and at (high) risk of escalation. For a start, the Islamic republic denies Israel’s right to exist and its leaders have issued threats to exterminate the Jewish state (that such threats lack credibility does not make them any less scary, especially to Israeli national leaders). Since its creation in 1979, the Islamic republic has also sponsored terrorist attacks against Israeli interests and engaged in proxy wars with Israel through sub-state actors in the region, which it continues to arm and support politically. Such factors and a mere history of past conflict increase the likelihood that a future Iran-Israel confrontation will rapidly escalate to war irrespective of the presence of nuclear weapons.

In sum, theories and studies of nuclear proliferation, past policies and behaviors of other nuclear weapons states, and Iran’s own past behavior during crises and conflicts are not reliable predictors of future Iranian behavior. The arguments of the "nuclear optimists" and "nuclear pessimists" with regard to a nuclear Iran can be proven neither wrong nor right at present, they remain hypothetical forecasts. Indeed, it is impossible to know in advance how Iran will behave if it acquires a nuclear weapons capability. It is also illogical to try to demonstrate that Iranian leaders will not act in a given way at some point in the future, especially if and when they obtain the absolute weapon, the ultimate deterrent. Iran can act rationally at one given time, and irrationally at another. Different situations require different behaviors and sets of policies. Equally important, what is rational for Iran’s regime may still be unacceptable for the United States, thus rendering the whole concept of rationality less than relevant when it comes to formulating a U.S. strategic response. Therefore, analysts should stop asking themselves if a nuclear Iran would act according to a "rational actor model.

From a U.S. policy standpoint, the far more pertinent and perhaps challenging question that should be answered is not how a nuclear Iran is likely to behave but what strategies and contingency plans the United States should formulate in advance to effectively deal with every possible Iranian scenario. The United States cannot afford to make educated guesses about a country that may be armed with the most destructive weapons on earth, has consistently manipulated the rules of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and concealed its nuclear capabilities, and has a long history of engaging in international terrorism and fomenting instability in neighboring countries.

Bilal Y. Saab is a visiting fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.