Kofi Annan and the curse of the mediator

Kofi Annan appeared at a press conference yesterday with current UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (Colum Lynch has the full transcript here). Most of what they said was entirely appropriate and unobjectionable (although Annan did infelicitiously say that he would "plead" for a meeting with Bashar al-Assad). The two UN men called for the killing in Syria to stop; they insisted that humanitarian aid reach the conflict’s victims; they prodded the international community to speak with one voice. But then Annan took things a step further:

There is a need for dialogue between all actors in Syria and that is what we would want to try and push as soon as possible, to get the dialogue going.  I know there are people who have other ideas, that dialogue may not be the way to go and one should use other means.  But, I think, for the sake of the people, for the sake of the Syrian people who are caught in the middle, a peaceful solution, through dialogue and a speedy one is a way to go. [emphasis added]

Annan’s wording was somewhat ambiguous, but the former Secretary General certainly seemed to be arguing that negotiations with the Syrian regime is the best way to resolve the crisis and that "other ideas"–presumably arming the rebels, establishing safe areas, or even carrying out air strikes–would not be helpful. I don’t understand why that step was necessary. Annan’s very difficult mandate is mediation. Given the apparent absence of other options, it’s a critical one. Why could he not simply leave it at that and not actively deprecate other more vigorous policy initiatives?

There is in Annan’s words a hint of the mediator’s malady: the assumption that because you have been tasked with mediating, that mediation is therefore the best and most effective option. Anyone familiar with the sad history of the Balkan wars will remember that the international community’s mediators then–notably Cyrus Vance and David Owen–often objected to more forcible options for addressing that conflict’s atrocities. Instead of simply pursuing their mandate and declining comment on other options, they deployed their authority and credibility against forcible intervention. In the end, Vance and Owen were wrong, and the hawks were right.

I would never argue that Annan should become an advocate for military intervention. Any statements to that effect would instantly render his position untenable. But is it too much to ask that he not use his vaunted moral authority to run down that option?