Time for Air Force reserve and active components to stop flaming each other
By Lt. Col. Tom Cooper, USAF Best Defense department of Rodney King affairs My friend Torch Ahmann made a plea recently to consider the reserve component as the path to airpower success and that the Air Force’s math for RC costs was flawed. A few days later, Al Robbert, the author of the "flawed" RAND ...
By Lt. Col. Tom Cooper, USAF
By Lt. Col. Tom Cooper, USAF
Best Defense department of Rodney King affairs
My friend Torch Ahmann made a plea recently to consider the reserve component as the path to airpower success and that the Air Force’s math for RC costs was flawed. A few days later, Al Robbert, the author of the "flawed" RAND study, defended his report. This is all well and good, but this dialogue detracts from explaining why airpower is important. It is more important to explain the risks of a shrinking air component and how the cooperation of the total air force (active, reserve, guard and civilian) helps mitigate that risk; ensuring airpower is capable and ready for the nation.
When looking at the historical evidence, the air force fully embraces the reserve component as the way to provide airpower “on the cheap.” In 1991, the authorized end-strength of the United States air force, air force reserve and air national guard were 415,000; 85,591; and 117,035 airmen. By 2012, active-duty end strength had been cut to 332,800. The air force reserve was reduced to 71,400 and the air national guard was reduced to 106,700 Airmen. This is a cut to the air national guard of only 9 percent while the active-duty force had been managing cuts of 20 percent. In 2013, the plan is for the active component to cut by 3,900 Airmen and the Air National Guard to be cut by 5,100 Airmen. Clearly this gap is not closing by much, proof that the leadership of the active Air Force fully appreciates the value inherent in citizen Airmen.
Over a 20 year period of persistent operational engagement by the air force, the total air force has been cut by 17 percent. This compares favorably with the cuts of the other services, (Army – 24 percent, Navy/Marine Corps – 34 percent) but is only favorable because the air force embraced the reserve component as a cheaper way of ensuring capacity was available for the nation to provide airpower.
This debate over cost needs to stop playing out in public. In a time of significant defense cuts, when the services would be cutting each other’s throats, the air force appears to be cutting its own throat. It is time for the total air force to proudly explain its contribution over the past two decades and for every airman to be able to explain the role of the air force in the future.
General Ron Fogleman, speaking at an Air Force Association event last week, said it is critical that the air force heal this rift: "We’re going into an era when we can’t think about what is active, what is guard, and what is [air force] reserve. We have to think total air force," said Fogleman. He noted, "We need friends and we need advocates. So we have to get over this internal fight."
The nation needs to understand why airpower’s range, speed and flexibility make it critical for force projection in uncertain times. (Comments to any air force related post on this blog are clear evidence of this.) Fighting over which component of the air force is cheaper detracts from the total force’s ability to make the case for airpower. Unfortunately, not making this case hurts all airmen and has a chance to hurt our nation.
Lt. Col. Tom Cooper is the air force fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He has generated his total force perspective as the son of a career air guardsman, spending five years as a loadmaster in the Air National Guard’s 105 AW and commanding a total force initiative squadron with the Air Force Reserve Command’s 932 AW.
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