Could an Israeli attack on Iran promote peace?

U.S. President Barack Obama might prefer to give the "green light" for an Israeli attack on Iran (if the diplomatic talks on Iran’s nuclear program fail) if he were convinced that it "could get the job done," as recently assessed by Walter Russell Mead. Is it really a bad idea? Absurd as it sounds, is there a logic to America letting Israel strike Iran’s nuclear installations rather than dissuading the Israelis? Could an ill-conceived war actually be a way to achieve a net-positive impact?

In the past, diplomatic breakthroughs for Israel have come after intense and prolonged periods of violence. Ironically, therefore, Israel’s attack could probably be an effective way to break the deadlock in the Middle East peace process that shows no signs of going anywhere on its own. While this path is certainly not a desirable option, it is worth considering how it might play out.

Even if a successful Israeli attack delays the Iranian nuclear project by four years at most, it will certainly leave an enduring imprint on the political culture in Israel. Any attack will incite Iran to retaliate by launching long-range missiles on Israel’s cities. The Israeli home front, however, is unprepared to be hit by thousands of missiles and rockets. In this case, the Iranian response could overshadow Israelis’ sense of victory buoyed by an impressive attack and invalidate the initial support given to the government’s act of war. A deadly and costly war of attrition is on the horizon. Furthermore, most Israelis are not really concerned about this nuclear threat. As shown by the Peace Index — an ongoing public opinion survey project aiming to systematically follow the common public opinion trends in Israel concerning the Israeli-Arab conflict — in November 2011, a sizable majority (61 percent) believed Israel should come to terms with the fact that Iran would ultimately have nuclear weapons. In February 2012, 19 percent believed that once Iran has nuclear weapons, there are high chances it would indeed use them against Israel and 63 percent opposed a unilateral Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. It is therefore safe to assume that even a successful attack would only create short-term euphoria, and most Israelis would not view it as a real relief from real danger.

Most importantly, unlike Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s attacks from Gaza and Lebanon, Tel Aviv would be targeted in the case of this scenario, the home of the Israeli elites and the cultural and economic capital of the country. Most likely, a scenario similar to that of the Gulf War in 1991 would repeat itself (only this time it would be worse), when a high proportion of citizens left town temporarily because of the Iraqi missiles that rained down on the city. This time the population might find refuge in less inhabited regions that may not be as targeted by the missiles, or simply remain shut in their homes. Unlike in 1991 (when 40 rockets targeted Israel), however, hundreds if not thousands of missiles would be launched. Then, only one civilian was killed, while according to Israel’s optimistic projection, a war with Iran would cause Israel to suffer about 500 civilian fatalities if not more. However, in contrast to the residents of Israel’s periphery, who have periodically been targeted by Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s rockets, the Israeli privileged and powerful elites would not tolerate a prolonged disruption of their lives.

The Gulf War did not generate political protest, as the Israeli government had not been held accountable either for the Iraqi attacks or for its inability to stop them. Yet the hit on Tel Aviv played a major role in helping the Israelis later internalize the limits of the use of force. Hence, this war provided backwind to the Oslo Accords two years later. Considering this aftermath to the Gulf War, we could expect a much more significant impact this time around if the Israeli government was viewed as bearing responsibility for the damage and death inflicted by an Israel-Iran war of attrition, with pointed questions surely raised by many Israelis regarding the war’s justification. After all, a vague threat is displaced by an immediate danger. Furthermore, with the ongoing rift between the elected leaders and the defense professionals over the urgency and effectiveness of an independent Israeli strike — which has recently become more apparent with the public announcements of Meir Dagan, Yuval Diskin and Benny Gantz — any military failure may further ignite criticism leveled against those who did not listen to the professionals’ advice.

It is in this moment of attrition, proving the fallacy of the assumption of "getting the job done," where American diplomats could step in and offer a new package deal: an Israel-Iran ceasefire, monitoring of the future Iranian nuclear project and Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank, as well as possibly the Golan heights if the situation in Syria is stabilized. This equation might compensate both the Israelis and Iranians for their losses, and especially imbue meaning and purpose to the Iranian sacrifice and thus help it to accept the equation.

It is most likely that public opinion in Israel would be more receptive of political compromise that eliminates a tangible threat, especially if this initiative could be tied to something like the outstanding Saudi peace initiative, which, despite the bitter antagonism between Iran and Saudi Arabia, could be part of a template proposal for new regional order. This proposed order may ease the mind of Israelis regarding possible future threats. With a new but also removable price tag attached to Israel’s control of the West Bank and the Golan Heights, fewer Israelis than ever may be inclined to subject their interests to the will of the local settlers of these territories. After all, there is consensus in public opinion in Israel around the so-called "two state solution" and the settlement project is not highly favored. With the current perceived low-cost rule on the West Bank, however, Israeli elites appear to lack the sufficient political energy or interest to induce the government to alter the status quo, but this could change if the cost rises. And the U.S., backed by European governments, may have both the ability and the motivation to impose its will in order to reduce collateral, primarily economic damage caused by any Israel-Iran war.

True, the costs are immense; however, as the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict shows, diplomatic endeavors have not brought about political breakthroughs, but only costly wars. It was Henry Kissinger who came to realize in 1973 that only a new round of Egyptian-Israeli war would persuade Israel to give up the Sinai Peninsula after six years of political stalemate.  Apparently, therefore, he did not work hard to prevent the war, delayed crucial aid to Israel once it had begun, and prevented Israel from gaining a clear-cut victory, all of which aimed to drive Israel to be more willing to compromise, culminating with Israel’s full withdrawal from Sinai in exchange for peace. A similar logic may be at work now, though with a more complicated equation.

If all of this sounds a tad far-fetched — well, in a way it is. There is of course a much more practical option that would not involve the death and destruction of the preceding scenario.

The Israeli leadership can embark on a different strategy: With the current formation of a new "national unity" coalition with the opposition centrist Kadima Party (under the new leadership of Shaul Mofaz, who has seemed critical of a belligerent Iran policy at times in the past), it can withdraw from the option of attacking Iran and promote a peaceful agenda with the Arabs in line with the neglected Saudi peace initiative. True, Israel can be better united to deal aggressively and immediately with the Iranian threat without fearing electoral consequences, but the government may also have more latitude to make concessions on the Palestinian front. Israel may even try to combine both options by encouraging the negotiations with Iran to expand the equation in order to increase Iran’s willingness to stop the nuclear military project. In a similar manner, Iran itself may put the expanded equation on the table and thereby justify its abandonment of its nuclear program, just as much as the U.S. and EU can play a more active role in promoting this more balanced state of affairs and thus encourage a trust-building process with Iran. In the end, when working through how events might proceed, an Israeli strike on Iran is simply not an acceptable option to achieve any kind of regional peace, and a tremendous effort should be done to guarantee that this path will not be the last resort in the Middle East.

Yagil Levy is associate professor at the Open University of Israel and currently Aaron and Cecile Goldman visiting professor in the department of government at Georgetown University. He is the author of 6 books on civil-military relations in Israel.