How Washington got savvy on treaty negotiation
There are many things to say about the failure of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations, which ended last Friday. But one critical factor in the outcome was the U.S. insistence that negotiations proceed by "consensus." That process effectively gave every country a veto over the negotiations and meant that the United States could not be ...
There are many things to say about the failure of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations, which ended last Friday. But one critical factor in the outcome was the U.S. insistence that negotiations proceed by "consensus." That process effectively gave every country a veto over the negotiations and meant that the United States could not be outvoted. The tactical wisdom of that approach became evident on Friday.
There are many things to say about the failure of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations, which ended last Friday. But one critical factor in the outcome was the U.S. insistence that negotiations proceed by "consensus." That process effectively gave every country a veto over the negotiations and meant that the United States could not be outvoted. The tactical wisdom of that approach became evident on Friday.
The conference’s organizers presented a final compromise text late Thurday. On Friday afternoon, the United States (along with Russia) informed other delegates that it needed additional time to study a text that most of the world supported. The insistence on more time was an obvious dodge. The United States didn’t need more time to study the text; it needed time to wait out the heated reelection campaign. But because of the consensus rule, the United States was able to pull the plug on the process without enduring the certain lopsided defeat that would have resulted if the delegates had voted on the text.
In the aftermath of the failed negotiations, the United States has gotten some blowback for its insistence on consensus. The Mexican government lambasted what it called "the imposition of the consensus rule." Oxfam’s Scott Stedjan accused the White House of "walk[ing] away at a critical moment." The anger is perfectly reasonable; the United States said it wanted a consensus rule to avoid a weak treaty. Instead, it used the process for political convenience. But the Obama administration will happily endure that kind of criticism over the alternatives: acquiescing to a treaty certain to become campaign fodder or facing an embarrassing diplomatic defeat.
David Bosco is a professor at Indiana University’s Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies. He is the author of The Poseidon Project: The Struggle to Govern the World’s Oceans. Twitter: @multilateralist
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