Daniel W. Drezner
How the U.N. Security Council seems like a grad school all-nighter
I have a shocking confession to make: it’s possible that maybe, just maybe, professors and graduate students don’t always finish tasks on time. Once in a blue moon, a project will sneak up on us that is due the next day, at which point the academic or aspiring academic is faced with the following menu ...
I have a shocking confession to make: it’s possible that maybe, just maybe, professors and graduate students don’t always finish tasks on time. Once in a blue moon, a project will sneak up on us that is due the next day, at which point the academic or aspiring academic is faced with the following menu of options:
1) Pull an all-nighter, throw every crazy idea onto the page, and pray something sticks;
2) Email whomever is waiting for your written work and explain that illness/unforseeen circumstances/preparations for the zombie apocalypse mean you need another week or so to finish;
3) Go dark on all social media, refuse to answer email queries, and hope that everything works out for the best.
You’d be surprised how many people opt for (3), but there it is.
I bring this up because of Mali. Now let me confess that I am about as far from an Africa expert as one can be. Let me further confess that I haven’t paid too much attention to Mali over the past year. My sum knowledge of the stituation there boils down to "there’s some trouble in the north," "the government ain’t that stable," and "gosh, people seem to be saying, ‘Al Qaeda!! There’s Al Qaeda in them thar hills!!’ an awful lot."
Still, reading this Financial Times story by Xan Rice on the United Nations’ latest plan of action for Mali, it doesn’t seem like the Security Council knows that much more than I do:
The UN Security Council has approved the deployment of an African force to retake northern Mali from al-Qaeda-linked insurgents.
The council also authorised the EU and individual countries to help equip and train Mali’s army, which is meant to work alongside the 3,300-strong international force. The proposed military operation is not expected to start before September 2013 to allow for proper planning and political progress in Mali….
The French-drafted text stresses the need for a twin track military and political plan. Deployment of the intervention force, known as the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, or AFISMA, was authorised for an initial one-year period to take “all necessary measures, in compliance with applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law”. Working alongside Mali’s armed forces, the goal is to retake northern Mali from “terrorist, extremist and armed groups”….
The UN resolution did not specify how the international mission will be funded. Nor is it clear how the force will be composed. The west African regional block Ecowas has pledged to supply the 3,300 troops, with Nigeria taking the lead. But US military officials believe that the desert conditions in northern Mali will be more suited to armies from non-Ecowas countries, such as Chad and Mauritania.
There are also questions about how Mali’s army will work with an outside force. Coup leader Captain Amadou Sanogo, who retains significant influence in Bamako and forced the prime minister to resignthis month, is wary of allowing in foreign troops, fearing his power will be diminished.
The resolution stressed that more military planning was needed, and the security council asked Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General, to report on the readiness of AFISMA troops before the start of any combat operations.
So, to sum up: the Security Council has pledged to send peacekeepers on a timetable that makes academic publishing seem speedy, without any idea of how it will be funded, staffed, or operate with indigenous forces, married to vague calls for political action to lay the groundwork for said peacekeepers.
So in this case, it appears that the Security Council has followed multiple academic routes — they scrambled to put something together at thre last minute, but still managed to kick the can down the road a great deal.
Again, let me confess that this could very well be the right thing to do — I’m no Mali expert. I do know something about procrastination and last-minute hackwork, however, and man, this reeks of it.
I hereby plead and beg Mali-watchers to correct my misperceptions in the comments. Cause from the outside, this whole thing seems damn peculiar.