Rational Security

Real Genius

Does the Pentagon need a creative director?

U.S. Army photo/1st Lt. Jonathan J Springer, 2-320th Field Artillery Regiment
U.S. Army photo/1st Lt. Jonathan J Springer, 2-320th Field Artillery Regiment

The great philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz was very clear about the resort to arms being a continuation of politics by other means, but he was more elusive about conflict outcomes. Because of factors like "friction" (a range that includes obstructions arising from bad weather and poor field coordination) and "the fog of war" (basically insufficient or inaccurate information), Clausewitz argued that chance reigned supreme, that the outcome of war was like "a game of cards." Yes, he thought that the genius of a great captain could overcome some of these problems. But later in On War he argued that contending sides, increasingly armed with the same sorts of weapons, would lead to an era in which sheer numerical advantage would determine war outcomes.

Nowhere in his work did Clausewitz see conflict as primarily posing a design challenge — a puzzle to be solved about what kind of force to build. Nor have other great thinkers about war focused on design solutions. From Clausewitz’s contemporary and rival, the Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, to modern strategists like B.H. Liddell Hart, the central aim has been to cultivate "genius" through mastery of a particular set of principles thought to govern war outcomes. For all the thousands of pages written about how to win wars, there are but few hints of the need for "design thinking."

Yet if one considers the long history of armed conflict from the standpoint of design, it is apparent that questions about how to arm one’s forces, and how to exploit an enemy’s technological points of vulnerability, have always been of crucial importance. In his Histories, for example, Herodotus lingers over the debate among the Athenians about whether to build a navy to fend off the threat from Persia, and what kind of ships to build. The Greeks decide to craft a fleet of small, maneuverable vessels, and to lure the Persians with their larger ships into a fight in narrow waters. The ensuing victory over the invaders from the East at Salamis was a striking affirmation of the power of design thinking.

Later, the Romans showed a deep appreciation for taking a design approach in the long struggle with Carthage. When they first went to sea, the Romans simply tried to imitate Carthaginian technology and tactics. Results were poor, as the hard-fighting Romans had limitations as sailors. But they soon found a design solution: the corvus, or "crow," a grappling device that allowed them to fix a Carthaginian vessel in place and board it. Rome soon had command of the sea, a factor that would prove decisive.

And so it goes throughout history. Design factors are almost always there, playing decisive roles. The British victory over the Spanish Armada in 1588 is all about design, as the ships of the Navy Royal (its name in the 16th century) and the "sea dog" privateers were both more maneuverable and more capable of firing at the enemy from standoff range. Gustavus Adolphus, in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), skillfully blended pikemen, musketeers, and light, mobile artillery in new ways, changing the course of a long and indecisive struggle and bringing Sweden onstage as a great power.

In the 19th century, there were some interesting insights into the design process, suggesting that it was not simply governed by technical advances. Abraham Lincoln, for example, understood that the railroad, which enabled the movement of massive forces over great distances, and the telegraph, which allowed coordination of their operations, implied a wholly different strategy from the one that his senior generals wanted. Where Union military leaders preferred to follow the Jominian principle of massing forces in one place, Lincoln insisted that the new technology overturned this principle, allowing instead a "cordon offense" striking at the South from several points simultaneously. After years of costly defeats, Lincoln finally found a general, U.S. Grant, who was willing to embrace his design for victory. The war was soon won.

In the years after the American Civil War, Otto von Bismarck demonstrated back in Europe that design principles could be applied at a very high level of statecraft. He made a point of very carefully isolating the targets of his aggression so that when Prussian forces marched against them they would have no allies to come to their rescue. Thus the chances of victory in wars against Denmark, Austria, and France were enhanced by Bismarck’s grand strategic design approach. It is highly ironic that Germany, which rose to world power on the shoulders of Bismarck, so soon forgot his principal lessons, and ended up fighting and losing two world wars against the overwhelming hosts of opposing alliances.

But Germany and its Axis partner Japan had other design problems as well in World War II, as Paul Kennedy’s marvelous new history, Engineers of Victory, makes clear. His is perhaps the first major study that poses a great war as a design challenge. From how to master the U-boat wolfpacks, to countering German blitzkrieg tactics, and beyond, Kennedy hones in on the ways in which design innovations were able to change the course, conduct, and outcome of battle. And his focus on the middle years of World War II, when Axis defeat was hardly a given, helps make clear that design factors made the difference between victory and defeat.

Coming closer to our time, it seems to me that design thinking would go a long way toward explaining the American debacle in Vietnam, where over half a million troops and massive firepower failed to defeat a badly outgunned foe. The design angle in this war is best viewed from the North Vietnamese side, where simple design innovations like loading bikes with hundreds of pounds of ammunition and rice and pushing them along a dirt path proved beyond the American ability to counter. Whenever the Ho Chi Minh Trail was bombed, some bike pushers were lost and potholes were created. But potholes were easily filled, and there were always more bikes and men. Thus the insurgency remained armed and fed, on its feet and fighting, until the frustrated Americans gave up and left.

Something similar is going on today, in this new age of irregular wars. The American instinct has been, all too often, driven toward massiveness in design — large field forces and tremendous firepower. Our enemies have persisted by means of designs that focus on creating lots of little Ho Chi Minh Trails, or "ratlines," and by making a wide variety of explosive devices that allow them to inflict casualties from a distance — that is, with little risk to their own forces. In Iraq, for a while, this was countered by the design solution of creating a physical network of small outposts and a social network based on convincing many of our enemies to switch sides. In Afghanistan, something similar is contemplated today, in the form of small outposts in villages and diplomatic deals with many tribal leaders. But we have to admit that our enemies’ designs have proved quite robust.

Still, in an era of looming budgetary constraints, awareness of the value and power of design thinking in military and security affairs may prove to be something of a secret weapon. Thus sequestration, far from crippling our military, might actually spur the sorts of design innovations that will enable victories to be won over enemy hosts who have, so far, been unimpressed with the "overwhelming force" approach of the Americans. It seems clear that only skillful new designs will lead to victory; it is just as clear that design thinking can allow us to do more, and do better, at lower cost. It’s worth a try.

John Arquilla earned his degrees in international relations from Rosary College (BA 1975) and Stanford University (MA 1989, PhD 1991). He has been teaching in the special operations program at the United States Naval Postgraduate School since 1993. He also serves as chairman of the Defense Analysis department.

Dr. Arquilla’s teaching interests revolve around the history of irregular warfare, terrorism, and the implications of the information age for society and security.

His books include: Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat and the International System (1992); From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient & Modern Times (1996), which was a featured alternate of the Military Book Club; In Athena’s Camp (1997); Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (2001), named a notable book of the year by the American Library Association; The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of Communism to the War on Terror (2006); Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (2008), which is about defense reform; Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World (2011); and Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s Longest War (2012).

Dr. Arquilla is also the author of more than one hundred articles dealing with a wide range of topics in military and security affairs. His work has appeared in the leading academic journals and in general publications like The New York Times, Forbes, Foreign Policy Magazine, The Atlantic Monthly, Wired and The New Republic. He is best known for his concept of “netwar” (i.e., the distinct manner in which those organized into networks fight). His vision of “swarm tactics” was selected by The New York Times as one of the “big ideas” of 2001; and in recent years Foreign Policy Magazine has listed him among the world’s “top 100 thinkers.”

In terms of policy experience, Dr. Arquilla worked as a consultant to General Norman Schwarzkopf during Operation Desert Storm, as part of a group of RAND analysts assigned to him. During the Kosovo War, he assisted deputy secretary of defense John Hamre on a range of issues in international information strategy. Since the onset of the war on terror, Dr. Arquilla has focused on assisting special operations forces and other units on practical “field problems.” Most recently, he worked for the White House as a member of a small, nonpartisan team of outsiders asked to articulate new directions for American defense policy.