Has Syria become Obama’s Rwanda?

I have been ruminating on the closing lines in Peter Feaver’s post below, suggesting that "Syria may prove to be Obama’s Rwanda." I worry that Peter is correct.

The similarities are striking. A president dogmatically focused on his domestic agenda who willfully disregards systemic and appalling bloodshed in a faraway land. A president haunted by the disappointments of recent U.S. interventions (in Clinton’s case, Somalia; in Obama’s case, Iraq and Afghanistan) who misapplies the "lessons" of this history into paralysis and inaction. A situation where the costs of action initially appear daunting — until they are weighed against the costs of inaction, which turn out to be even more damaging. 

In several ways, however, Obama’s passivity on Syria is even worse than Clinton’s passivity on Rwanda. First, the Assad regime in Syria also embodies a number of strategic equities that Rwanda did not, including possessing a large stock of chemical weapons, being the main regional ally for Iran, being a state sponsor of terrorism, and now being a breeding ground for jihadists, many of whom harbor hostile intentions toward the United States. Bringing this regime to an end is a fundamental American interest and should be seen as such even by those not moved to moral outrage at the over 70,000 Syrians (and perhaps many more) murdered by their own government. Second, the Rwandan genocide took place over three months — time enough for the U.S. to have acted, to be sure, but still a relatively narrow window.  But the bloodshed in Syria has been occurring for almost two years now. Third, many foreign policy experts in the Democratic party (including many currently serving in the Obama Administration) realize that the president’s policy is a failure — and those not in government are saying so publicly. Or in the case of courageous voices like Anne Marie Slaughter have been saying so for a long time now.

Yet at this point all we get are carefully crafted leaks from the administration on the eve of Secretary of State John Kerry’s meeting with skeptical Syrian rebel leaders that consideration is being given to supplying them with "non-lethal" aid, such as body armor. This would have been helpful two years ago when the first peaceful protests began. But it is pathetically insufficient in the face of Assad’s Scud missile attacks on civilian populations. 

As I and many others have pointed out before, one perverse irony of the Obama administration’s neglect of Syria is that now, two years into the war, the costs of action are much higher and the options much fewer. Many of the downside risks that purportedly deterred greater American support for the rebels 18 months ago — such as sectarian strife, radicalization, regional instability, and resentment towards the United States — have now come to pass anyway, in part because of American inaction. Yet this does not mean that even at this point nothing can or should be done.

In the crucible of policymaking, officials should ask themselves more often how they will look back on the decisions they made while in power. Former President Bill Clinton has repeatedly said that one of his biggest regrets was not intervening in Rwanda. As Obama and the senior members of his national security team consider the memoirs they will inevitably write and the speeches they will invariably give after leaving office, they might reflect now on what they will later say about their greatest regrets. At or near the top of that list will likely be "Syria." So why not do something about it now, before Syria becomes permanently mentioned in historical ignominy alongside Rwanda?