Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster on the big hole in the COIN and security forces manuals
When Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster offers a criticism of the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine, you know he’s not just riding intellectual fashion. This is a guy who has done well both in conventional warfare (see 73 Easting) and counterinsurgency (see Tell Afar). In a new publication by McKinsey and Company called McKinsey on Defense, McMaster tells ...
When Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster offers a criticism of the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine, you know he's not just riding intellectual fashion. This is a guy who has done well both in conventional warfare (see 73 Easting) and counterinsurgency (see Tell Afar).
In a new publication by McKinsey and Company called McKinsey on Defense, McMaster tells Andrew Erdmann that "our doctrine is still catching up" with how we need to fight. He explains:
We have the counterinsurgency manual, the stability operations manual, and the security-force assistance manual, but I don't think we have put the politics at the center of those manuals. So, for example, we assume in our doctrine that the challenges associated with developing indigenous security forces are mainly about building capacity, when, in fact, they're about trying to develop institutions that can survive and that will operate in a way that is at least congruent with our interests.
When Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster offers a criticism of the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine, you know he’s not just riding intellectual fashion. This is a guy who has done well both in conventional warfare (see 73 Easting) and counterinsurgency (see Tell Afar).
In a new publication by McKinsey and Company called McKinsey on Defense, McMaster tells Andrew Erdmann that “our doctrine is still catching up” with how we need to fight. He explains:
We have the counterinsurgency manual, the stability operations manual, and the security-force assistance manual, but I don’t think we have put the politics at the center of those manuals. So, for example, we assume in our doctrine that the challenges associated with developing indigenous security forces are mainly about building capacity, when, in fact, they’re about trying to develop institutions that can survive and that will operate in a way that is at least congruent with our interests.
McMaster also says that, “We need leaders who have physical and moral courage on the battlefield, of course, but also the courage to speak their minds and offer respectful and candid feedback to their superiors. Our leaders can’t feel compelled to tell their bosses what they want to hear.”
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