Did the regimental system optimize the British army for small wars? And what does that all mean for today’s U.S. Army?
Those, little grasshoppers, are the two questions that occurred to me as I read Max Hastings’s comment (in Winston’s War) that during World War II, "German, American and Russian professional soldiers thought in divisions; the British always thought of the regiment, the cherished ‘military family.’ Until the end of the war, the dead hand of ...
Those, little grasshoppers, are the two questions that occurred to me as I read Max Hastings's comment (in Winston's War) that during World War II, "German, American and Russian professional soldiers thought in divisions; the British always thought of the regiment, the cherished ‘military family.' Until the end of the war, the dead hand of centralized, top-down command methods, together with lack of a fighting doctrine common to the entire army, hampered operations in the field."
This was, Hastings goes on to write, one reason that the Germans were better at everything from combined arms attacks to mundane but essential tasks such as recovering disabled tanks and trucks from the battlefield.
Yet that same small, cohesive structure might have been good for fighting small wars, with units able to carry on quietly for years without getting much attention, getting to know one area well.
Those, little grasshoppers, are the two questions that occurred to me as I read Max Hastings’s comment (in Winston’s War) that during World War II, "German, American and Russian professional soldiers thought in divisions; the British always thought of the regiment, the cherished ‘military family.’ Until the end of the war, the dead hand of centralized, top-down command methods, together with lack of a fighting doctrine common to the entire army, hampered operations in the field."
This was, Hastings goes on to write, one reason that the Germans were better at everything from combined arms attacks to mundane but essential tasks such as recovering disabled tanks and trucks from the battlefield.
Yet that same small, cohesive structure might have been good for fighting small wars, with units able to carry on quietly for years without getting much attention, getting to know one area well.
So: What, if anything, does this suggest for how the U.S. Army should be organized for the future? (Or should the small war mission be sent back to the Marines?)
More from Foreign Policy
Lessons for the Next War
Twelve experts weigh in on how to prevent, deter, and—if necessary—fight the next conflict.
It’s High Time to Prepare for Russia’s Collapse
Not planning for the possibility of disintegration betrays a dangerous lack of imagination.
Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine
The artillery-fired cluster munitions could be lethal to Russian troops—and Ukrainian civilians.
Congrats, You’re a Member of Congress. Now Listen Up.
Some brief foreign-policy advice for the newest members of the U.S. legislature.
Sign up for Morning Brief
Foreign Policy’s flagship daily newsletter with what’s coming up around the world today. Delivered weekdays.
By submitting your email, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use and to receive email correspondence from us. You may opt out at any time.
