Seven killed and hundreds injured in Cairo clashes

Overnight clashes between security forces and supporters of deposed President Mohamed Morsi killed two people at a bridge in central Cairo and five in the Giza district, and also led to the arrest of 401 people. The violence erupted when hundreds of pro-Morsi protesters blocked the Sixth of October bridge, a major thoroughfare in downtown Cairo. The clashes came hours after the visit by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, who urged an inclusive and nonviolent path forward in his public statement to Egyptians: "We have called on the military to avoid any politically motivated arrests. And we have also called upon those who differ with the government to adhere to their absolute obligation to participate peacefully." Burns met with Egypt’s interim leaders, but was shunned by other key actors — namely the Tamarod anti-Morsi movement, the Salafist Nour Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Representing the bloodiest episode since July 8, when soldiers and security forces killed at least 50 Morsi supporters outside the Republican Guard compound, Monday’s battles signified the continued disaffection of the Muslim Brotherhood and pro-Morsi camp. Meanwhile, Egyptian liberals and leftists have largely embraced the military’s crackdown of the Brotherhood and its supporters, deepening the country’s societal polarization.    

Syria

Syrian rebels reinforced their positions in a key Damascus suburb on Tuesday in an effort to repel the regime offensive against the capital. The Syrian opposition forces defending Qaboun, a rebel-held district in Damascus, intend the influx of additional troops to stem the regime’s campaign to conquer rebel strongholds throughout the country. Extreme violence persists elsewhere, as the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that nine Syrians were "executed" at a regime checkpoint in Damascus province Monday evening. In Homs, pro-regime militants killed seven members of a local reconciliation committee, according to the Observatory. Furthermore, the two-year-long conflict continues to take its toll on the Syrian economy, which has shrunk by 35 percent since the conflict began. The Syrian currency remains in sharp decline, and nearly half of the country is unemployed. While opposition within the U.S. Congress has stalled the delivery of lethal assistance to Syrian rebels, Britain has pledged equipment that would protect the Syrian rebels from chemical and biological weapons.

Headlines

• Hundreds took to the streets in Israel and the Palestinian territories to protest against a plan to resettle Bedouin Arabs in the southern Negev desert.
• The Government of Israel approved Egypt’s plan to deploy two additional infantry battalions to confront Islamist militants in the Sinai Peninsula, where troop levels are limited by the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
• Attacks throughout Iraq killed nine people on Monday, including a 10-year-old boy, continuing the recent wave of violence wracking the country.
• U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is returning to the Middle East this week to discuss developments in Egypt and Syria with Arab League officials in Jordan. 

Arguments & Analysis

‘Middle Eastern Mad Libs: "Egypt is ____________"‘ (Steven Cook, From the Potomac to the Euphrates)

"After the January 25 uprising, uninformed observers asked ‘Is Turkey the "model" for Egypt?’ or ‘Will Egypt follow Indonesia’s path?’ Comparisons are always useful in the effort to explain how the world works, but under the circumstances it seemed that people were flailing away looking for something, anything to make sense of a new vastly more complicated Middle East. If Egypt was Turkey — which at the time looked more liberal and prosperous than it does now — then perhaps for the many challenges that lay ahead for Egyptians (and U.S. interests), all would end well.

The military’s July 3rd intervention has provided another opportunity to play the Egypt analogy game. This time there was, however, a doomsday quality to the discussion.  Instead of an Egyptian Copenhagen criteria or Reformasi on the Nile, Egypt is now Algeria. Specifically, Algeria of the 1990s when more than 100,000 people were killed in a brutal civil conflict. The problem is: Egypt is Egypt and if analysts want to gain some traction on what might happen there, they should pay attention to Egypt rather than reacquainting themselves with le Pouvoir, Abbas Madani, the Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS), and Chadli Benjedid."

‘Tunisia’s Islamists fear the long shadow of Egypt’s Morsi‘ (Faisal Al Yafai, The National)

"In no capital city in the Arab world is the transition in Egypt more closely watched than in Tunis. With the demise of the government of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, there remains only one post-Arab Spring country with Islamists at the helm. Ennahda may have been at odds with some of what the Muslim Brotherhood was doing in Egypt, but it knows that, as the mood of the Arab publics turn against the Brotherhood, it will find itself more closely scrutinised than ever.

The idea that Islamists were the sole winners of the Arab Spring was always somewhat oversimplified and overstated.

In Tunisia and Egypt, the first two countries to go through revolutions, the ballot box gave the most power to the formerly-hunted Islamists. But elsewhere, the picture was mixed. Exactly a year ago, Islamists lost out in Libya’s election to a more secular-minded coalition. In Yemen, the Islamist party Islah was already a political force before the revolution, holding the second largest number of seats in parliament. Since the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh was pushed out, their influence has slightly diminished, with the focus shifting to Hirak, the movement for southern secession.

Nonetheless, no organised movement was better placed to capitalise on the chaos of these postrevolutionary countries than the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood. While campaigning in Libya, Brotherhood parties distributed leaflets reading: ‘You have heard of us. Now hear from us!’ That could apply to Islamists across the Arab world. In Egypt, many didn’t like what they heard."

‘Failure to Unite‘ (Myriam Benraad, Sada)

"On June 27, 2013, Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced the final results of the provincial elections held in the two predominantly Sunni Arab provinces of Anbar and Ninawa. Voter turnout in Anbar reached 49.5%, but was significantly lower in Ninawa at 37.5%. The polls in Anbar and Ninawa were pushed from April (when the rest of Iraq’s provinces had their elections) to late June. The Kurdistan Regional Government (Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymania) is expected to have theirs in September 2013. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki invoked ‘security concerns’ to justify his decision to delay elections in both provinces — namely increasing insurgent attacks and assassinations of candidates and members of the armed forces. However, his decision was in fact primarily motivated by months of unprecedented anti-government protests carried out by politically marginalized and disenfranchised Sunni Arab populations. These protests first broke out in December 2012 following the unexpected arrest of several guards of former Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi — an Anbar native linked to Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiyya bloc who has since resigned from government. The unrest then spread across other Sunni Arab provinces including Ninawa, Salahaddin, Diyala, Baghdad, and Tamim. 

These provincial election results illustrate the enduring resentment and sociopolitical alienation of Sunni Arab populations over a decade after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and a clear weakening of the political process in the country. Compared to the 2009 elections, fewer Sunni Arab voters went to the ballot box, while political parties scattered among a variety of alliances. Once again, these elections demonstrated the difficulty for Sunni Arabs to organize themselves and define an effective action plan in their lasting confrontation with the Shia dominated central government. This has not only benefited al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition and its partners, but also the Kurdish parties in their regions.

Just as Sunni Arabs were marginalized under the U.S. occupation for their collective association with the former regime, most Sunni Arabs still have not been reintegrated into new institutions and face what they perceive to be discriminatory policies aimed at ‘de-Sunnifying’ Iraq.  In particular, they maintain that without the abolition of ‘de-Ba‘athification,’ as well as certain laws and anti-terrorism provisions, political normalization will be impossible. Previously downplayed by the U.S. coalition, these demands have been met with disdain by the Shia-led government. In fact, instead of engaging in a dialogue, al-Maliki has persistently refused to involve the opposition — notably Sunni Arabs — in public debates and decision- making. In response, criticisms of this apparently authoritarian drift have mounted steadily in the last months."

— Joshua Haber