As Mali Holds Elections, What Lessons Can the U.S. Learn?

The elections in Mali this Sunday, July 28, are an important milestone for a country trying to return to democracy after not only a military coup, but also a takeover in its north by Islamist extremists and the influence of al Qaeda. Thanks to quick French action, the Tuareg militants were expelled, and al Qaeda didn’t get a foothold. The coup actually created a chaotic situation favorable to the Islamists and al Qaeda, but now there will finally be an opportunity for the north and south to reconcile.

While some are criticizing the French for being too quick to leave, others note that Malians themselves set the date for the elections and their goal was to return to a democratically elected government before the interim government could get too comfortable. In the short (or medium) term, security will become the United Nations’ problem; the economy will become the international donors’ problem; and governance will become the Malians’ problem with, I hope, sufficient help from the United States and others. Pretty much how one would expect given the circumstances, but it is too soon to attempt predictions for Mali’s future.

But what of the foreign-policy problem that this crisis was for the United States? What can we learn from hindsight?

Move quickly — that is what we can learn. In a world that still needs the West to seek out and defeat terrorists, we can look back and say, "Thank God for the French." That’s not a phrase regularly used in Washington foreign-policy circles, to be sure, but one quite apt here. Because of Paris’s quick intervention, radical Islamists were thwarted. From what were they thwarted? An attempt to turn the north of Mali into another al Qaedastan, complete with radical Islamists controlling all of society and thus the future. Sources both on the ground and among the intelligentsia tell us that speedy action to prevent al Qaeda’s money, ideas, and oppressive ways from taking root has kept us from having to face a generation raised on radicalism and unquenchable hate for the West that expresses itself in terrorism.

Mali has a chance not to turn out like Afghanistan did when the Taliban ruled over an al Qaeda protectorate in the 1990s (let’s not repeat that mistake, please), or like parts of several other northern African states where al Qaeda and other terrorist groups found safe haven, or like what might be happening right now in parts of Syria. But the second chance is in large part because the French moved so fast and now because the United States and others are trying to support civil society and the fundamentals of democratic life in Mali.

Washington tends to see the problem in Mali as a radical extremism problem and the response as counterinsurgency. The reality is that extremism takes time to settle in. Al Qaeda wasn’t in charge long enough to really make extremism stick. Had al Qaeda remained in charge in the north much longer, it would have established a narrative among young, disenfranchised people to radicalize them. The task, therefore, is straightforward: We must empower Muslims to work with other Muslims on the basis of natural rights, which have a venerable tradition in Islam, albeit small and not terribly influential. But no matter, it is the only answer because the problem is not just poverty or lack of access to capital and education. Those are symptoms of a deeper problem: a culture and the institutions it spawns that keep men and women in political, social, and economic chains. As in most of the developing world, this is not easy, and it takes at least a generation to see lasting progress. The "easy" cases of Eastern Europe and Latin America, comparatively speaking, are not likely to be repeated. 

If we get this right, we might not only succeed in helping Mali stay whole and get back on the path to democracy from which it has strayed, but we might also prevent further erosion in the entire Sahel, preventing slides in Mauritania and northern Nigeria.