Syria Shouldn’t Be Treated as Chance to Score Political Points

President Barack Obama was right to seek congressional approval for an attack on Syria, even if he took too long to do so. How he and his White House team are going about winning support for their still-vague plan of attack is, however, quite a different and more troubling matter. In a word, the president seems once again to be playing tactical politics while warning of the strategic consequences of not toeing his line.

Fed by administration innuendo, media reports have been describing the vote as one whose fate rests squarely on Republican shoulders, as if Democrats who oppose intervention are mere bystanders. The vote is also being portrayed as one that will pit neoconservatives against neo-isolationists, as if there can be no principled opposition to an uncertain and dangerous Syrian adventure that does not emanate from the Tea Party crowd.

Yet there are many legislators, as well as military and national security analysts, who have supported military interventions in the past and would do so again in the future, but who are seriously troubled by the administration’s plan. For these legislators, it is not a matter of doubting the intelligence that appears to prove conclusively that Bashar al-Assad employed chemical weapons. Rather, for them the concern is that an attack on Syria would not only do little to further American strategic interests, but would actually harm them.

After all, if Assad falls, Washington will again have forced regime change in the Arab Middle East, whether directly, as in Iraq, or indirectly, as in Libya. Yet another regime change is likely to unleash a new wave of Arab anti-Americanism. In addition, it would provide a boost to Islamic radicalism as well, especially since the Islamists would be in an excellent position to seize power in Damascus, with serious implications for the security of the moderate Arab states and, of course, Israel. On the other hand, if Assad survives, the damage to Iran and Hezbollah would be minimal, with the threat to Israel in particular in no way diminished.

Yet the administration’s political maneuverings do not end with characterizing those who question its policies as latter-day "Know Nothings." To make matters even worse, top White House officials have been contacting Jewish rabbis, leaders, and organizations on the occasion of the Jewish new year (which begins this week) to argue that a strike against Syria is the best way to ensure that Iran does not develop a bomb that it would likely use against Israel. Presumably, the administration hopes that Jewish groups will take its dire warnings to heart and pressure pro-Israel congressmen in particular to support the administration’s proposed resolution authorizing an operation against Assad’s forces.

Such entreaties are reminiscent of Ahmed Chalabi’s smarmy efforts to convince Washington in the spring and summer of 2002 that a new Iraqi regime would open the old British pipeline from Kirkuk to Haifa. And they are just as distasteful. The last thing Israel and its American supporters need is to be dragged into a debate on a complex, highly nuanced issue with few good options, uncertain costs, and no clearly positive outcomes.

Israeli policymakers have generally been silent about their own preferred conclusion to the Syrian civil war precisely because they recognize that there are few good outcomes for Israel, whether or not Assad remains in power. Israel’s American friends know that the issue is not really about Israel. It is not that they are lobbying the White House. The White House has been lobbying them. One can only hope that the administration will focus on what it views are the medium- and long-term strategic merits of its case, whatever these might be, and not treat a serious national security matter as yet another opportunity to score political points on Capitol Hill.