Chapter and Verse of Security Council Resolutions

In Geneva, Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov are negotiating the outlines of a UN Security Council resolution that would create a framework for the control or handover of Syria’s chemical weapons. While the details of their discussion are unknown, one central question appears to be whether the resolution will invoke Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In recent years, Chapter VII—the section of the Charter that outlines the Security  Council’s coercive powers—has assumed talismanic significance.  Here’s a CBS News account:

The Western powers among the Security Council’s permanent members — France, the U.S. and the U.K. — want a resolution under Chapter VII, which authorizes the use of force; Russia has suggested either a presidential statement or a resolution under Chapter VI, which mandates the peaceful dispute of settlements — if there is a formal resolution at all.

There are a couple of misconceptions in this kind of shorthand, and the research organization Security Council Report produced a good primer several years ago to help clear up matters.  First, the invocation of Chapter VII doesn’t itself authorize force. Slews of Council resolutions reference Chapter VII without authorizing force.  Specific language is required to do so, normally something along the lines of "all necessary means." Second, a resolution not under Chapter VII can be legally binding if the Council intends for it to be. Again, the specific Council language is what’s critical:

The question as to whether the Council has imposed an obligation binding under articles 24 and 25 should be determined from the Council’s actual language in any given situation. And this seems true for resolutions adopted explicitly under Chapter VII as well, since they often also contain non-binding provisions such as recommendations. It is not the reference to a particular chapter that is the ultimate arbiter of whether a resolution contains binding provisions.

Those looking for clarity on whatever emerges from the Kerry-Lavrov confab need to look well beyond Chapter VII.

But it’s also important to recognize that the key players drafting resolutions often don’t want them to be clear. Resolutions are hard fought compromises, and points that can’t be cleanly resolved are often papered over with language that can be interpreted in multiple ways. The famous Resolution 1441 on Iraq, for example, was designed to be unclear on the question of whether further Council action was necessary to authorize force. The Americans and British could point to language suggesting not, while the French and Russians inserted language implying the opposite. Absent that ambiguity, they likely wouldn’t have struck a deal. Further back in history, the landmark Resolution 242 was studiously unclear on whether Israel had an obligation to withdraw from some or all of the territories it occupied during the 1967 war.

For leaders keen to show evidence of diplomatic progress, an ambiguous resolution is better than none at all.