Michael Horowitz’s fine study of how and why military innovations are adopted

Over the last few years, the United States has moved to limit China’s technological rise. U.S.-led sanctions have imposed unprecedented limits on Beijing’s access to advanced computing c...Show morehips. In response, China has accelerated its own efforts to develop its technological industry and reduce its dependence on external imports.  According to Dan Wang, a technology expert and visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, China’s tech competitiveness is grounded in manufacturing capabilities. And sometimes China’s strategy beats America’s.  Where is this new tech war headed? How are other countries being impacted as a result? In what ways are they reassessing their relationships with the world’s largest economic superpowers? Join FP’s Ravi Agrawal in conversation with Wang for a discussion about China’s technological rise and whether U.S. actions can really stop it. 

For decades, the U.S. foreign-policy establishment has made the assumption that India could serve as a partner as the United States jostles with China for power in the Indo-Pacific region. B...Show moreut Ashley J. Tellis, a longtime watcher of U.S.-India relations, says that Washington’s expectations of New Delhi are misplaced.  In a widely read Foreign Affairs essay, Tellis makes the case that the White House should recalibrate its expectations of India. Is Tellis right?  Send in your questions for an in-depth discussion with Tellis and FP Live host Ravi Agrawal ahead of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the White House on June 22.  

Last weekend, spy chiefs and defense officials from around the world descended on Singapore to attend the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s biggest annual security conference. The U.S. delegatio...Show moren was led by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who asked for a bilateral meeting with China’s new defense minister, Li Shangfu. The request was denied, perhaps in part because Li has been sanctioned by Washington for his role in the purchase of military equipment from Moscow. Over the course of the three-day summit, which I attended, Li and Austin didn’t speak with each other; they spoke at each other. In dueling speeches, Austin summoned the usual Washington buzzwords—a “free and open Indo-Pacific”—and made the point that talks with China were necessary, not a bargaining chip. When Li’s turn came, he responded with familiar Beijing-speak, criticizing Western hypocrisy and Washington’s growing security partnerships in Asia. But while China shut the United States out, it welcomed talks with Europe. EU foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, and British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace all secured bilateral meetings with China’s Li. The Singapore summit underscored how the U.S.-China relationship was different from that of Europe’s relationship with China, its biggest trading partner. But what is the substance of those differences, and will Beijing try to exploit them? For answers, FP’s Ravi Agrawal spoke to Cindy Yu, an assistant editor at the Spectator and the host of its Chinese Whispers podcast, and James Palmer, the writer of FP’s weekly China Brief newsletter. FP subscribers can watch the full discussion or read an edited and condensed transcript, exclusive to FP Insiders.